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Abstract

For nearly twenty years, 111 1st Street, a former tobacco warehouse, stood as the vibrant
center of the arts community in Jersey City, New Jersey. The owner of 111 1 st Street evicted its
resident artists in 2005 and demolished the building in 2007. Artists are often viewed as an
integral component to the gentrification process. However, the case of 111 1 st Street suggests a
possible alteration to the typical, gradual process of gentrification and challenges the established
scholarship on the relationship between artists and gentrification. This thesis will use interviews
and original research to recreate the narrative and history of 111 1st Street, focusing on the events
surrounding its demise and its ultimate destruction. Additionally, this thesis will utilize 111 1st
Street to highlight any resulting gaps in current gentrification theory.
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“It was a cobble stone side street with garages, post-Civil
War architecture, and small warehouses that was now coming
to life, as these industrial streets will, when pioneer artists
scrub, clear out, and scrape the years from wide windows
and let in the light.”1
-Patti Smith
Introduction
For nearly twenty years from the late 1980s to 2005, a shifting cast of artists and artisans
worked and lived at 111 1st Street, a former tobacco warehouse, in Jersey City, New Jersey,
building a vibrant and eclectic community and injecting energy into a wasteland of largely
abandoned warehouses and silent factories. Artists from around the United States and, to a lesser
degree, the world gravitated towards this building, and its residents believed that 111 1 st Street
and ultimately Jersey City would develop into a creative center existing alongside Manhattan on
the opposite side of the Hudson River. At the time, this dream appeared to be possible, even
probable. The gathering of artists at 111 1st Street and Jersey City paralleled the “discovery” of
the Williamsburg neighborhood in the borough of Brooklyn by artists and like-minded creative
types and professionals. The forces of gentrification beset both areas and reshaped their
landscapes during the last several decades. However, the burgeoning artistic communities in
Jersey City and Brooklyn reached far different conclusions. Today, several Brooklyn
neighborhoods (Williamsburg, Greenpoint, and recently Bushwick) carry reputations as artistic
1

Patti Smith, Just Kids (New York: Ecco, 2010): 213.
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hubs and attract aspiring bohemians and curious visitors to their sites and streets. 111 1 st Street
experienced a different fate: it was obliterated. Today, a massive block-sized lot strewn with
rubble and debris sits at the address of this once bustling, fecund community. No sign, no
plaque, nothing commemorates its presence (See: Figure 4 and Figure 5). Why? What happened
to 111 1st Street and its artists?
Before its life as an arts community and later as a setting for conflict and displacement,
111 1st Street operated as a tobacco warehouse and factory for the majority of its long existence.
The building was constructed in 1866 for the American Screw Company in the Greek Revival
style of architecture. The original structure was a four-story timber and brick frame facing the
Hudson River. In 1874, the P. Lorillard Tobacco Company acquired the property and built
additions, following the same architectural style. In the inner courtyard of the property, a fivestory structure and a one-hundred-eighty-foot chimney were built. Ultimately, the property
would consist of six connected buildings and four courtyards (See: Figure 1). Lorillard
manufactured cigarettes, cigars, snuff, and pipe tobacco on the site, and 111 1 st Street would
serve as a factory and warehouse until 1956. The signage reading P. Lorillard Company
remained visible on the 1st Street side of the warehouse until its razing (See: Figure 2 and Figure
3).2
The P. Lorillard Tobacco Company figured prominently in the industrial and political
history of Jersey City. By the end of the nineteen century, Lorillard was the largest manufacturer
of tobacco products in the United States.3 Noting the centennial of Hudson County in 1940, a

2

Carmela Karnoutsos, “P. Lorillard Tobacco Company,” Jersey City Past and Present: A to Z
(http://www.njcu.edu/programs/jchistory/pages/L_Pages/Lorillard_Tobacco.htm); William Rodwell, Timeline: 111
First Street, Jersey City, NJ: 1866-2005; interview with author, June 18, 2011.
3
Carmela Karnoutsos, “P. Lorillard Tobacco Company,” Jersey City Past and Present: A to Z
(http://www.njcu.edu/programs/jchistory/pages/L_Pages/Lorillard_Tobacco.htm).
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local newspaper article claimed that “[n]o industry has been more completely identified with
Jersey City throughout the years than Lorillards.” 4 The centennial also “furnishe[d] the occasion
for paying tribute to this family which has done so much in an industrial way to put Jersey City
on the map.”5 Another publication cited Lorillard as “the leading industry in Jersey City” and
that it did “more to advertise Jersey City in the markets of the world than any other
manufacturing industry.”6 A future mayor of Jersey City, Charles Sielder (mayoralty, 18761878), was a partner at Lorillard. Dr. Leonard Gordon, a civil war veteran and a prominent civic
leader in Jersey City, who founded the public library and had a neighborhood park named in his
honor, worked as the chief chemist and physician for Lorillard. 7
The destruction of a building central to the industrial and economic development of
Jersey City and associated with important local figures calls into question the position of history
in the ever-changing identity of Jersey City and the values of the city’s elites. The shattering of a
vibrant and large community of artists may have been foreseen and ultimately inevitable as
gentrification gathered force in the area; however, the chosen demolition of 111 1 st Street, a
building rich with history, reveals a rather crass and sad pursuit of short-term economic gains at
the expense of long-term aesthetic, cultural, and civic good.
Entering the second decade of the twenty-first century, policy makers, scholars, activists,
and citizens continue to debate the contours and the effects of gentrification. Gentrification, in
one form or another, is a reality facing many municipalities and regions throughout the United
States and North America. Artists stand as a particular community often impacted and displaced
4

“Lorillard Company Over 180 Years Old,” Jersey City Observer, May 18, 1940.
Ibid.
6
Publication information unknown, photocopy found in Business & Industry vertical file, Jersey City Free Public
Library.
7
Carmela Karnoutsos, “P. Lorillard Tobacco Company,” Jersey City Past and Present: A to Z
(http://www.njcu.edu/programs/jchistory/pages/L_Pages/Lorillard_Tobacco.htm).
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by gentrification. However, the specific relationship between gentrification and the creative
class, especially artists, is far more complex than a simple pattern of displacement. Artists
themselves play a role---an often integral and essential one--in the gentrification process and
they hold a unique position in gentrifying and gentrified areas. Past gentrification followed a
seemingly set pattern: an area gradually shifted from disinvestment to large-scale capital
investment. In the case of 111 1st Street, several stages or waves appear to have been skipped
when the gentrification process leapfrogged from near total disinvestment to rapid revalorization.
This disruption can be witnessed in the effects of gentrification upon the artists of the building.
Ultimately, the case of 111 1st Street questions whether the historical process of gentrification
may have been interrupted---if not completely altered---in the more affluent global cities.
This thesis will study the gentrification of Jersey City, New Jersey, and specifically the
gentrification forces that shaped and ultimately destroyed the arts community at 111 1 st Street.
Located in a former industrial corridor sandwiched between the redeveloped waterfront of Jersey
City and the “rediscovered” historic downtown neighborhoods, the building housed an arts
community for nearly twenty years. After much legal-wrangling in 2005, the property owner
evicted the artists working or living in the warehouse and then demolished it in 2007. The owner
obtained a zoning variance and released plans for high-rise luxury housing. However, the
downturn of the national economy and the collapse of the housing market in 2008 altered such
optimistic grand planning, resulting in the property standing vacant of the date of this writing.
Like other former industrial centers, Jersey City has viewed back-office work and real
estate as the linchpins of its present and future economy. The recent economic downturn
illustrates the danger of relying upon an economy solely based upon services and consumption.
Furthermore, sitting directly across the Hudson River from Manhattan, Jersey City exists as a
8

satellite of New York City. Its identity and its economy are intertwined with that of New York
City and the greater metropolitan region. Therefore, a city like Jersey City lacks the independent
cultural, economic, social, and economic resources of larger cities and even smaller regional
cities. How can Jersey City and similar peripheral municipalities cope with globalization,
deindustrialization, and gentrification? Does Jersey City possess any truly viable alternatives?8
Beyond a handful of articles in local publications, little has been written about the extinct
and somewhat mythical building of 111 1st Street.9 When scholars, authors, and journalists
explore the life of artists and their relationships with localities, they often detail storied and
romantic settings, such as London, Paris, and New York. New Jersey---with its own rather
undervalued history of arts and literature---does not stand high in the popular imagination as a
cauldron of creativity. 10 In the public imagination, New Jersey is ridiculed as a landscape of
shopping malls, multi-lane highways, and insatiable suburban sprawl. Culture, history, and art
do not belong to New Jersey, and they certainly do not belong to Jersey City.
Likewise, scholars of gentrification have produced a rich, varied, and somewhat combative
body of literature exploring gentrification forces and processes. 11 Unfortunately, this literature

8

This might prove to be too complicated and too lengthy of a discussion to properly address in the research and the
thesis of the author. Nonetheless, the author shall remain mindful of these questions as he proceeds with his work.
9
Kate Rounds, “The Fate of 111 First Street: Artists, Development, and the Destiny of a City,” Jersey City
Magazine 6, no. 2 (fall/winter 2009/2010): 52-57. In the author’s opinion, this magazine article provides a great
introduction to 111 1st Street. In the spirit of full disclosure, the author’s inspiration for his research and writing on
111 1st Street originated from his reading this article. Before reading this article, the author had only overheard
conversations about the building and its community. His only encounter with the building was watching its
demolition. Little did he suspect that he would spend several years of his scholastic career reading, thinking, and
talking about 111 1st Street.
10
James F. Broderick, Paging New Jersey: a Literary Guide to the Garden State (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 2003). This interesting volume discusses the many respected authors who have called the Garden
State home over the years and the novels set in the state. Broderick’s work represents a cottage industry among the
state’s intelligentsia to reclaim and promote New Jersey as a state with a unique history and culture standing apart
from New York and Philadelphia. A discussion of this phenomenon would be an engaging cultural study itself and
goes well beyond the scope of this author’s project.
11
Note: see Literature Review section for further discussion.
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largely concerns itself with New York, London, and other major or world cities. This reality is
easy to explain. Scholarship and writing require an intimidating amount of research and sweat.
Any prospective study of New York promises to uncover a far greater amount of evidence and
resources with comparative ease than the study of a city with fewer and less affluent cultural and
educational institutions. For instance, it requires little effort and know-how to electronically
search the historical New York Times index than it does to travel to a distant locale, leaf through
a paper index, and laboriously scroll through reels of microfilm to find several articles in the
local newspaper. Moreover, any scholar, author, or creative thinker builds upon previous work;
therefore, this partiality to the well-worn paths continues. Such a pattern leads to the distinct
possibility of monotony of thought and more worryingly the ignoring of alternative areas of
research. This is not a criticism or a condemnation of the current scholarship. This is a simple
statement of fact to explain the gaps in gentrification literature.
A major goal of this project is to attempt to fill one such gap in the scholarship. The study of
111 1st Street will shift the focus of scholarship away from the bustling, glamorous metropolis of
New York to smaller, grittier but no less fascinating Jersey City on the left bank of the Hudson
River. The author hopes that future students and scholars find a model in this thesis and initiate
their own efforts in researching and writing about the satellites revolving around contemporary
global cities or other unsung urban areas.
As noted, very little has been written about 111 1st Street, and no scholarship has documented
the building and its community. After years of legal and even physical combat, the final
residents left 111 1st Street in 2005 and the community scattered. Some of the artists still reside
in Jersey City and remain active in the local arts and culture scene. Other artists still live in the
surrounding area or in New Jersey. Some artists crossed the river and settled among the five
10

boroughs of New York City. Some residents even packed their possessions and left for
purportedly more welcoming environs throughout the United States. With 111 1 st Street
demolished and its community dispersed, the site as a physical entity and a movement drifts
further into the past and the danger of it being forgotten exists as a true possibility. This thesis
aims to capture the story of this now departed artistic community and encase its memory and
preserve it for future scholarship and appreciation. As many of the artists interviewed for this
project stated: “The spirit of 111 lives on.” This writing will help ensure that belief.
This study of 111 1st Street would be impossible without an interdisciplinary approach. The
author relied upon scholarship in the fields of history, sociology, political science, cultural
studies, political economy, geography, cultural economics, and even works of memoir, art, and
literature to develop his thinking and to construct a theoretical armature for his chronicle of 111
1st Street. In particular, the two major gentrification theories, the creative class theory, and the
urban growth coalition theory heavily influenced his interpretation of the events surrounding 111
1st Street. This will be evident in the primary discussion of the site. Another goal of this project
is to weave together these seemingly disparate theories into the discussion of gentrification and
artists. No serious work on gentrification should ignore the urban growth coalition theory or the
creative class theory. Unfortunately, although the proponents of these schools of thought appear
to speak a similar language and investigate similar processes, they fail to fully communicate with
another. Interdisciplinary scholarship allows this bridge to be built and enhances the
understanding of gentrification as a historical, sociological, economic, and even political process.
This approach will be utilized in the review of the literature.
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Review of the Literature
Urbanists, geographers, and even armchair observers of the city acknowledge the role of
artists in the ever-evolving gentrification process. Two competing models dominate current
gentrification theory and these competing models interpret the presence and the role of the artist
in gentrification far differently. Additionally, other urban theories---somewhat ignored or
undervalued by gentrification scholars---can and should inform discussions concerning the artist
and gentrification and possibly hint at a far less hostile and more complicated interaction
between the artistic class and old-time residents of newly valorized neighborhoods.
Gentrification remains a vibrant, adaptive process; theory must allow itself a similar organic,
elastic nature in its documentation and exploration of its subject.
The following discussion will present a targeted but regrettably limited summary of the
battling models of gentrification and of the scholarship exploring the agency of artists. As with
any honest academic work, this project raises another set of questions and suggests further
research.
Production (Demand) Model of Gentrification
The production model or demand model of gentrification is solidly based in physical
space and urban geography. In many ways, this model can be described as a Marxist
interpretation of the development of space and property in the urban environment. In fact, the
initial sketches of the production model of gentrification can be found in the work of David
Harvey. 12 Traditional neo-liberal economic theory states that property always lies at its “highest

12

David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982): 330-372.
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and best possible use.”13 Harvey challenges this belief by stating that buildings and structures
often do not represent the optimal use of land. Buildings must be demolished and replaced to
achieve this optimal usage; however, a dilapidated building or an under-valorized property might
still remain a productive investment. Thus, ownership often eschews optimal usage in order to
maximize the original capitalization of the property.
Neil Smith pushes the limits of Harvey’s original conception of rent and property and
ultimately establishes the production model of gentrification. 14 Arguably, Smith’s most
innovative and influential contribution to the gentrification debate remains his rent gap theory.
The rent gap theory consists of three elements: property value, capitalized rent, and potential
rent. The property value is simply the monetary value of the property and its structures. The
capitalized rent is the income which the owner receives from the current usage of the property.
The potential value is the maximum value of the property at its highest usage. As the area
surrounding a given property develops and increases in exchange value, the gap between the
capitalized value and the potential value of property grows. This is the rent gap. According to
Smith, at the initial growth of the rent gap, property owners disinvest in property in order to
maximize their initial investments and gain the maximum profit from the eventual sale of the
property. This rent gap produces gentrification and displacement.

13

Michael Porter, “The Rent-Gap at the Metropolitan Scale: New York City’s Land-Value Valleys, 1990-2006,”
Urban Geography 31, no. 3 (2010): 387.
14
Neil Smith, The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City (London: Routledge, 1996).
Additionally, Smith argues that gentrification also leads to a revanchist city. The revanchist strategy aims to
eliminate the marginalized, the poor, the homeless, all unsavory elements---essentially the “other”---from the city
and sanitize the city. This is a fascinating and disturbing argument. However, for the course of this discussion, this
element of Smith’s work will remain untouched.

13

Smith further develops his production model by presenting gentrification as a global
urban strategy promulgated and implemented by capital and neo-liberal proponents.15 Originally,
gentrification emerged as a fitful, localized phenomenon. Now, it appears to exist as a coherent
strategy and an adopted policy by governments increasingly throughout the world. Jason
Hackworth expands this framework as well, arguing that gentrification---now a neo-liberal
economic project---is a more corporate-driven and state-facilitated process than in past
permutations. 16
Smith and production model theorists view artists as agents in the gentrification process.
According to the production theory of gentrification, artists first tame a given neighborhood and
then transform it into an environment amenable to capital and the middle class. This
characterization of artists largely ignores the conflicted, often ambiguous role of artists and other
creative types in gentrification. Artists and like-minded bohemians inarguably alter the character
and the geography of a neighborhood or an urban area; however, they lack monetary capital and
express distaste for consumption, homogeneity, and traditional middle-class values. Artists and
their associates eventually become victims of gentrification themselves. For example,
Greenwich Village, the historical bohemia of New York, now operates as a residency for the
uber-wealthy and contains only isolated relics of its artistic past.
Consumption (Demand) Model of Gentrification
While the production model of gentrification centers on geography, the consumption
model of gentrification rests upon a societal or a sociological armature. The genesis of this

15

Neil Smith, “New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as Global Urban Strategy,” Antipode 34, no. 3
(2002): 427-450.
16
Jason Hackworth, The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2007).
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model can be traced back to the work of Daniel Bell. 17 Bell first articulated a post-industrial
thesis, positing that a population of scientists, technocrats, and knowledge workers would create
and maintain the means of a post-industrial society. The economy, society, and the state would
eventually orient itself around this group. Richard Florida further explores and popularizes this
concept.18
In his study of gentrification in Canadian cities, David Ley classifies this emerging class
as a new middle class. 19 This new middle class espouses a set of mores and priorities far
different than that of their post-war predecessors. First-wave gentrifiers---typically artists,
sexual minorities, educators, and other such types---locate in the city to pursue a different
lifestyle than that offered by the suburbs. Also, these early gentrifiers view the city as an
authentic environment exuding a genuine sense of place. Regrettably, these desires seem to shift
focus from politics, values, and aesthetics to mere consumerism. This is the trap and the
dilemma of the consumption model of gentrification.
Ley returns to his hypothesis and expands upon it. 20 He confronts the critics who blame
artists for gentrification, noting that gentrification victimizes artists alongside poor and working
class populations. Artists imbue a long neglected or abandoned space with an aura. This space
or area grows in reputation and attracts capital and more affluent professionals. Then, the artists
themselves are pushed out. Additionally, Ley returns to the problematic emphasis on

17

Daniel Bell, The Coming of Postindustrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books,
1973).
18
Richard Florida, Cities and the Creative Class (New York: Routledge, 2005); Richard Florida, The Rise of the
Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002). Unfortunately, Florida’s reputation has fallen due to his almost
shameless huckstering of his creative class program to businesses, civic leaders, and public officials. This does not
discount his ideas, but it suggests that any thinker should approach them with skepticism.
19
David Ley, The New Middle Class and the Remaking of the Central City (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
20
David Ley, “Artists, Aestheticisation and the Field of Gentrification,” Urban Studies 40, no. 12 (November
2003): 2527-2544.
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consumption as a signifier of difference and distinction. By purchasing a unique product---such
as a vintage hat or a pound of grass-fed beef---the consumer makes a cultural and a class
statement. The politics and values of the back-to-the-city movement seem to have been
forgotten.
Arguably, Ley’s work and that of Jon Caufield present the notion of the emancipatory
city.21 The city and gentrification allow individuals social, economic, and political freedom
denied in rural and suburban areas. Although not specifically writing about gentrification,
Florida presents the notion of a creative class searching for places offering tolerances, culture,
and amenities. This theory strongly parallels the consumption model.
Artists & Gentrification
Although no authoritative work exists on artists and their role and relationship in the
gentrification process, several insightful and illustrative case studies explore the subject. Most
famously, Sharon Zukin analyzes the transformation of Manhattan’s SoHo from a site of light
industry to an artistic enclave and finally to a lucrative real estate market. 22 Zukin formulated
the theory of the artistic mode of production. Essentially, capital uses artists as cover for
investment in an area. Investors, property owners, and capital encourage artists to reside in a
locale, thus, improving the reputation and increasing the monetary value of the area. The
lifestyle of the artist and the artistic space itself becomes a marketable commodity as well. This
explains the birth of the loft as an enviable urban living space.

21

Jon Caufield, City Form and Everyday Life: Toronto’s Gentrification and Critical Social Practice (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1994).
22
Sharon Zukin, Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press,
1982).
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Other scholars use Zukin’s template as a starting-point for their own explorations of
artists and gentrification. David Cole studies three cities along the Port Authroity Trans-Hudson
(PATH) train line in New Jersey: Hoboken, Jersey City, and Newark. 23 Julie Podmore observes
the loft trend and its linkage to artists in Montreal, Canada. 24 Stuart Cameron and Jon Coaffee
perceive the artistic mode of production as public policy in the state’s effort to rejuvenate and
gentrify Gateshead in northeastern England. 25
Several recent case studies chronicle and analyze the transformation of neighborhoods by
artists and the eventual gentrification of those neighborhoods. Christopher Mele presents a
thorough social and cultural history of the Lower East Side, devoting several chapters to the
placement and the role of artists in the neighborhood.26 Richard Lloyd observes the artistic and
creative community in Wicker Park in Chicago and creates an ethnography of sorts of a
contemporary bohemia. 27 Most tellingly, John Paul Cantungal, Deborah Leslie, and Yvonne Hii
illustrate the displacement of artists due to gentrification in Liberty Village, Toronto, Canada. 28
Although intersecting at specific junctures, the competing gentrification models point to
different forces behind the gentrification process. These models offer very different frameworks
through which to perceive the role of artists in the urban sphere and in gentrification. The
continual gentrification debates also point to the unresolved, yet nonetheless engaging

23

David B. Cole, “Artists and Urban Development,” Geographical Review 77, no. 4 (October 1987): 391-407.
Julie Podmore, “(Re)Reading the ‘Loft Living’ Habitus in Montreal’s Inner City,” International Journal of Urban
and Regional Research 22, no. 2 (1998): 283-302.
25
Stuart Cameron and Jon Coaffee, “Art, Gentrification and Regeneration---From Artists as Pioneer to Public Arts,”
European Journal of Housing Policy 5, no. 1 (April 2005): 39-58.
26
Christopher Mele, Selling the Lower East Side: Culture, Real Estate, and Resistance in New York City
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 2000).
27
Richard Lloyd, Neo-Bohemia (New York: Routledge, 2006).
28
John Paul Catungal, Deborah Leslie, and Yvonne Hii, “Geographies of Displacement in the Creative City: the
Case of Liberty Village, Toronto,” Urban Studies 46, no. 5/6 (May 2009): 1095-1114.
24
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conversation concerning the relationship between artists and gentrification. If anything, the
literature highlights the complex role of artists and the need for further research into the subject.
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Methodology
As noted earlier, very little has been documented and written about the departed
community at 111 1st Street. The last remaining tenants left the building in 2005, and the owner
completed the demolition of the building two years later in 2007. Artists as a group maintain an
almost gypsy-like culture: they shift from place to place in search of low rents and amenable
settings to create art. Thus, many of the artists associated with 111 1 st Street have left Jersey
City and the New York metropolitan area. For these reasons---the scant existence of primary
and secondary sources and the absence of a present population to study---the author expected a
difficult if not impossible task of tracking down sources and piecing together scraps of reportage
to create a coherent and compelling narrative. In fact, the author fully expected to ultimately
curtail his project and continue his research and writing in a more limited fashion.
To his surprise, he found and contacted a large yet manageable number of individuals
involved in the history and subsequent battle for 111 1st Street. Businesses, non-profits, and
residents all presented the author with their anecdotes, observations, and impressions concerning
111 1st Street and the arts in Jersey City, New Jersey. Aware of the controversial and combative
decisions made regarding 111 1st Street and, even more importantly, fully comprehending the
long and rich history of political malfeasance and corruption in Jersey City and Hudson County,
the author was pleasantly surprised by the willingness and generally helpfulness of county and
city officials to speak with the author and assist him in his work.
Sources were contacted and interviews were conducted largely between May 2011 and
September 2011. The author spoke with the subjects face-to-face or via telephone or via email.
This project also demonstrated the utility of social media in contemporary original scholarship

19

(and to this skeptic and critic of many of the elements of the still evolving computer age). The
author was able to quickly locate possible sources through Facebook and make initial contact
with them. The author also relied upon old-fashioned and thoroughly tested methods of
establishing contact. He stopped by businesses and offices, left phone and voicemail messages,
and wrote many emails. To develop and prune a list of potential contacts, the author relied on
“snowball” sampling. After talking with a subject, the author asked the said subject to refer him
to other relevant individuals. This proved to be remarkably successful. The author was able to
meet and talk with several of the major figures involved in 111 1st Street and the failed fight for
its survival. Also, the author used his knowledge of and contacts in the local arts community and
political community to link with institutions and individuals. All interviewed subjects were
asked a set list of questions. These questions varied depending on the individual interviewed
(artists/resident; business; government agency/official; or, non-profit institution) and if the
individual was active in the area during the life and death of 111 1 st Street. These questions can
be found in the appendix (See: Appendix II). In almost all instances, the author did not vary
from the established questionnaire and avoided follow-up and tangential questions.
In the course of five months, the author contacted thirty-eight (38) parties. As stated
above, these parties includes artists and residents of 111 1 st Street, non-profit and civic
institutions, and area businesses servicing artists or related to the local arts community. Twentyone (21) artists and residents of 111 1st Street were contacted; ten (10) artists and residents were
interviewed. Four (4) businesses were contacted; two (2) businesses were interviewed. Four (4)
government officials were contacted; three (3) government officials were interviewed. Nine (9)
non-profit and civic organizations were contacted; four (4) non-profit and civic organizations
were interviewed. In total, nineteen (19) parties agreed to interviews. (Table 1 offers a complete
20

analysis.) Several individuals declined to meet with the author. One developer flatly refused to
talk with the author upon reading the waiver required by the Internal Review Board (IRB). 29
Several artists and former residents of 111 1st Street complained of psychological and spiritual
wounds over the struggle for the building and voiced no desire to revisit memories of the
building.
Contacted

Interviewed

Artists & Residents

21

10

Businesses

4

2

Government Agencies

4

3

9

4

38

19

& Officials
Non-Profit &
Civic Institutions
Total

Table 1: Statistics of Sources Contacted and Interviewed (May 2011-September 2011)
Archival research complimented the above described interview process. The New Jersey
Room of the Jersey City Free Public Library maintains extensive archives and files. Contents,
newspaper clippings, and assorted documents housed in this collection fleshed out the narrative

29

This is a troubling and legitimate issue to be considered by present and future students and scholars. The
developer in question appeared amiable and was referred to the author by another source. However, he refused to
have further contact with the author, citing the waiver. A journalist or a non-academic author would not be required
to furnish such a document to a source or an interviewee. This requirement severely hampers original research in
the humanities and urban studies, especially when researching and discussing controversial and still raw subjects
and topics. The author strongly urges the Urban Studies faculty to investigate this matter and press for a resolution
favorable to scholarship and intellectual freedom.
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largely provided by the residents and participants of 111 1 st Street.30 This collection is an
invaluable resource for this and any future scholar and student.

30

The author utilized the following vertical files at the New Jersey Room of the Jersey City Free Public Library:
Business & Industry: Lorillard Company; Buildings: 111 1st Street; Hudson County Arts: 1990s; and, Hudson
County Arts: 2000s. The author cannot express enough gratitude to the library staff and resident historians who
dutifully clipped newspaper articles, gathered seemingly worthless scraps of paper, and diligently built a rich, oneof-a-kind archive of local history, culture, and life. Without such people, this story and so many others could never
be written or even imagined.
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Chapter 1:
The Value of Art
Today, the borough of Brooklyn, New York, specifically its neighborhoods of
Williamsburg, Greenpoint and now Bushwick, attracts young, hungry, and aspiring artists,
craftsmen, writers, and creative people of all persuasions. (Admittedly, these neighborhoods also
draw an alarming number of professional partiers, floaters, and hangers-on. However, every
artistic scene in modern history has dealt with such a reality.) 31 The arts and culture
establishment and the larger machinery of the cultural economy operates in Manhattan. 32 On the
other hand, the grassroots arts scene lives in Brooklyn. The neighborhoods of Williamsburg and
Greenpoint have followed the trajectory first observed in Manhattan’s SoHo.33 A largely
industrial landscape of small manufacturers, warehouses, and shipping depots gave way to
artists’ lofts, cafes, and funky boutiques. Capital and investment soon followed, further altering
the landscape and demographics. This transformation is ongoing in Williamsburg and its
adjacent neighborhoods. Nonetheless, the presence of the arts and a population of artists still
dominate the collective imagination and popular perception of the neighborhood.
31

Some scholars might argue that such a secondary population contains the seeds of the second wave of
gentrification. This wave consists of people who are not risk-adverse artists or down-at-the heel bohemians, but a
class of people who appreciate the arts and all manners of creativity and simply wish to circulate within such a
heady environment. David Ley, “Artists, Aestheticisation and the Field of Gentrification,” Urban Studies 40, no. 12
(November 2003): 2538-2541.
32
For a highly readable examination of the cultural economy and a persuasive case for its integral position in the
larger New York economy and for the importance of arts and culture, see Elizabeth Currid, The Warhol Economy.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). Also, for a quick summary, read Elizabeth Currid, “Bohemia as
Subculture: “Bohemia” as Industry: Art, Culture, and Economic Development,” Journal of Planning Literature 23,
no. 4 (May 2009): 368-382.
33
Winifred Curran follows the scholastic template designed by Zukin, chronicling and interpreting the loss of local
industry in the face of a growing population of artists. Winifred Curran, “From the Frying Pan to the Oven:
Gentrification and the Experience of Industrial Displacement in Williamsburg, Brooklyn,” Urban Studies 44, no. 8
(July 2007): 1427-1440; Winifred Curran. “In Defense of Old Industrial Spaces: Manufacturing, Creativity and
Innovation in Williamsburg, Brooklyn,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 34, no. 4
(December 2010): 871-885; Sharon Zukin, Loft Living: Cultural Capital and Urban Change (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1982).
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This shift of concentration of artists from Manhattan, largely from the East Village and
the Lower East Side, to the Brooklyn waterfront was far from predetermined or inevitable. 34
Instead, this population could have fled across the Hudson River and into Jersey City, New
Jersey. 35 111 1st Street could have served as a beachhead for such an invasion.36 In fact, many of
the artists of 111 1st Street moved to the building from exorbitantly priced studios and living
spaces in Manhattan and Brooklyn. An interviewed artist succinctly summed up the possibilities
and the sad fate of 111 1st Street and maybe Jersey City itself as a haven for artists and associated
creative types:
“Jersey City is closer to Manhattan than Brooklyn …
Promise always there [for Jersey City to develop as
an arts hub], that’s why artists stayed so long.
Interesting town, frustrating. Brooklyn was starting to
happen, and Jersey City cut off its artists at the same time.
The city doesn’t want artists ... Town that could have been …” 37
The final thought contained in the above quote (“Town that could have been …”) captures the
essence of the story of 111 1st Street.

34

The subject of artists in the East Village and the Lower East Side and their role in gentrification are an endlessly
fascinating subject for scholars. For a great summary, see Christopher Mele, The Selling of the Lower East Side:
Culture, Resistance, and Real Estate in New York City (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). As
stated, the author hopes to move the discussion of gentrification away from the comfortable environ of New York
City. The author will avoid getting bogged down into discussions and asides about the subject. Nonetheless, any
serious discussion of artists and gentrification must refer to New York City.
35
Artist trickled into Hoboken and, to a lesser degree, into Jersey City in the 1970s. David B. Cole, “Artists and
Urban Development,” Geographical Review 77, no. 4 (October 1987): 391-407. Unfortunately, Hoboken felt that
full assault of gentrification. Its proximity to Wall Street and its easy access via the PATH train and New Jersey
Transit bus lines almost ensured that capital and real estate interests would dominate the city. Today, little
archaeological evidence exists of a past arts community. Through conversations with artists and residents, the
author learned that many of this original influx of artists, creative types, and urbanists, now in their 50s and 60s,
either purchased property in Hoboken, moved to Jersey City or other areas in Hudson County, or altogether left New
Jersey. Hoboken is now a full-blown repository of employees from the financial sector and exudes a stale,
homogeneous mentality.
36
This thought was voiced by many of the interviewed artists. In fact, they lamented the fact that this did not occur.
Interviews with author, June 26, 2011; interview with author, July 15, 2011.
37
Interview with author, July 15, 2011.
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For its residents, 111 1st Street was more than just a building, a physical structure with
four walls and a ceiling, and a collection of ragtag figures toying with art for a few years before
getting serious about life. 111 1st Street was a moment, a flowering of creativity and artistic
production. Just like any organic moment, whether it be Montmartre in Paris in the 1920s,
Haight Asbury in San Francisco in the late 1960s, or Seattle in the 1990s, 111 1st Street had a
finite lifespan. 38 Several sources voiced similar sentiments:
That’s the nature of any arts scene: something dies and then
is recreated elsewhere. 39
and
All scenes have a shelf-life---scene hit fever pitch---amazing to
see.40

Every moment sparks, burns brightly, and then flickers out. Then, that movement is gone and
never to return. Only later, once a movement has passed into history do outsiders recognize it as
such a phenomenon.
***
Enter the Artists: The First Years of 111 1st Street
The beginning of 111 1st Street as an arts center and community resembles myth more
than fact. This is a characteristic common to many artistic enclaves or, to use the proper
38

In his study of Wicker Park, Chicago, Richard Lloyd discussed Urbis Orbis, a café that operated in that
neighborhood operated roughly for a decade (1989-1998) and served as a mecca of sorts for aspiring artists,
wayfarers, and eccentrics. Even the café itself had an almost predetermined a half-life. The café serves a sample of
bohemia in general. Richard Lloyd, Neo-Bohemia: Art and Commerce in the Postindustrial City (New York:
Routledge, 2006): 106-112. “Despite huge local popularity and national recognition that reached its zenith when
Rolling Stone magazine named it “the coolest place [in Chicago] to suck down a cappuccino,” … It closed down in
1998 …Urbis Orbis did match the social vision of its proprietor, as a place where a local cadre of artists and others
attracted to the lifestyle affectations of bohemia interacted and developed a sense of community … In 2001,
Starbucks opened the outlet long dreaded by neighborhood purists …” Ibid: 112.
39
Interview with the author: June 22, 2011.
40
Interview with the author: July 15, 2011. Source compared 111 1st Street to the hippies starting in San Francisco.
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terminology---bohemias. The concept of artists standing apart from society and constituting a
unique and separate community was first found in nineteenth century Paris through the writings
of the critic and theorist Walter Benjamin. 41 Moreover, modern bohemia holds a symbiotic
relationship with the city and the urban landscape. 42 111 1st Street belongs to this rich tradition.
Reportedly, artists began gravitating toward 111 1st Street in the late 1980s. A quasianonymous musician known as “Gennaro” rented a practice studio on the third floor of the
former tobacco warehouse, earning him the designation as the first arts tenant. 43 A former
resident heavily involved in the community claimed this as fact:
Legend has it that the first "arts" tenant in the building was
a musician who had a studio on the 3rd floor, a guy by the
name of Gennaro. This was back in 1987-1988.44
This statement alone establishes a creation myth for 111 1 st Street: an unknown troubadour
moves into a largely abandoned building, serving as a moral beacon for other individuals craving
a space of their own. No written record exists, only whispers and rumors. 45
For the next two years, artists and musicians continued to hear about the low rents and
large spaces of the building and planted the seeds for a large, yet physically insular community

41

Richard Lloyd, Neo-Bohemia: Art and Commerce in the Postindustrial City (New York: Routledge, 2006): 11-12:
“The origins of the term as a designation for the artists’ quarter lie in the nineteenth-century Paris, tagged by Walter
Benjamin as “the capital of the nineteenth century,” for him the very cradle of aesthetic innovation.”
42
Ibid: 17: “… indeed, that the cumulative imagery of the artist in the city is directly inscribed on the practical
strategies of contemporary social actors.” Ibid: 48-50. “Added in the early decades of the nineteenth century were
the inescapably urban connotations of bohemia. Urbanism as a way of life is imprinted upon the bohemian project,
inflecting both practical strategies and aesthetic representation.” Ibid: 49.
43
William Rodwell, Timeline: 111 First Street, Jersey City, NJ: 1866-2005.
44
Interview with author, June 26, 2011.
45
This is a poetical and somewhat misleading statement. Different sources noted different people or groups as the
first explorers or colonizers of 111 1st Street. However, the source cited in Footnote 35 is one of the more trusted
and respected sources on the life and history of 111 1st Street. Thus, the naming of a musician named “Gennaro”
will be accepted as fact, unless otherwise disputed or disproven. The author believes that this “Gennaro” is Gennaro
Tedesco. Tedesco is one of several artists featured in an early news article on 111 1st Street. Beth Kissinger, “Arts
Movement: Goodbye SoHo, Lightin’ Out for New Territory,” Jersey Journal, August 6, 1990.
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in Jersey City. In the early 1990s, the building also continued to house small industries, the
historic driver of the economy in the warehouse district and the Jersey City waterfront. 46 The
nascent arts community---itself a component in the local economic engine---voiced enthusiasm
for the diversification within the building and, arguably, by extension the surrounding area:

The good thing about the building is that it’s not all artists,
but woodworkers too … It helps break up that ‘all arts concept’
---too much purity is not good.47

This wrinkle in the expected gentrification narrative is worth considering. Artists,
students, gays, and other risk-adverse populations are often considered to be the shock-troops of
gentrification. Residents of 111 1st Street themselves were well aware of this process:

Artists gravitate to places where they can get cheap rent,
with studio space, without the distraction of over development,
chain stores, suburban comforts. Neglected older neighborhoods
tend to be good places for such new migration. They want a sense
of adventure by moving to a place that can serve as a proving
ground for experimentation in a number of areas. In a sense
we like being pioneers or homesteaders, especially
in an urban location, sometimes rural, but not exclusively
in major cities.48

Another artist more succinctly described the role of artists in gentrification:

Typically, artists go the worst areas, clean it up, make it
safe for yuppies. 49

46

“The building is also home to the businesses of some non-artists, including a dress manufacturer, a screen printing
company and a carpentry shop.”Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Interview with author, July 11, 2011.
49
Interview with author, July 15, 2011.
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Artists, in particular, first move into a given area and imbue it with a sense of cultural
cachet and, in time, economic value.50 However, much of the criticism of gentrification focuses
on displaced groups, predominantly inner-city minority populations and, to lesser degree, white
working class populations. This was never an issue in the unfolding history of 111 1 st Street.
The building stood amid neglected warehouses, silent railway tracks, cobblestone streets, and the
former powerhouse for the Port Authority Trans Hudson (PATH) trains or the Hudson Tubes.
Aside from the growing cluster of artists, no one lived in the dying industrial neighborhood,
apart from the homeless and a certain criminal element. The gentrification was largely of an
economic variety: light industry (small manufacturers, storage, and shipping) was slowly giving
way to artistic production. Sharon Zukin first and best described this model in her landmark
study of SoHo in Manhattan, and Winifred Curran further developed Zukin’s model in her
research on Williamsburg, Brooklyn. 51 The ownership of 111 1st Street expressed a similar
vision for the building in 1990.52

50

“[A]rtists are also [the middle class’s] advancing or colonizing arm … The urban artist is commonly the
expeditionary force for inner-city gentrifiers, pacifying new frontiers ahead of the settlement of more mainstream
residents. As a successful inner-city realtor declared, if in doubt when marketing to the new middle class, ‘follow
the hippies’”: David Ley, The New Middle Class and the Remaking of the Central City (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996): 192; Christopher Mele, Selling the Lower East Side: Culture, Real Estate, and Resistance in New York
City (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000): 233-236; Neil Smith, The New Frontier: Gentrification
and the Revanchist City (New York: Routledge Press, 1996): 18-20; 198-200; Urban Affairs Quarterly 25, no. 4
(June 1990): 621: “…[T]he models to explain the differentiation among the in-movers during the different stages is
the in-movers’ attitudes toward risk. Those moving in earliest are the risk-oblivious, willing to chance their financial
investment and, perhaps their personal safety.”; Robert Kerstein, “Stage Models of Gentrification: an Examination,”.
Also, see Clay’s (1979) Stage Model of Gentrification in Loretta Lees, Tom Slater, and Elvin Wyly, Gentrification
(New York: Routledge, 2008): 31-33: [A] small group of risk-oblivious people move in and renovate properties for
their own use.”
51
Sharon Zukin, Loft Living: Cultural Capital and Urban Change (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1982); Loretta Lees, Tom Slater, and Elvin Wyly, Gentrification (New York: Routledge, 2008): 118-121. Winifred
Curran, “From the Frying Pan to the Oven: Gentrification and the Experience of Industrial Displacement in
Williamsburg, Brooklyn,” Urban Studies 44, no. 8 (July 2007): 1427-1440; Winifred Curran. “In Defense of Old
Industrial Spaces: Manufacturing, Creativity and Innovation in Williamsburg, Brooklyn,” International Journal of
Urban and Regional Research 34, no. 4 (December 2010): 871-885.
52
“Ennis seems to be set on the “artists concept, though … Ennis envisions a “real arts” center---more artists, several
galleries---in the future. ‘The potential is great,’ he says. ‘Anywhere artists go seems to enhance the community.’”
Beth Kissinger, “Arts Movement: Goodbye SoHo, Lightin’ Out for New Territory,” Jersey Journal, August 6, 1990.
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However, the initial batch of artists did not view the remaining light industrial inhabitants
as their rivals for space and position. How much industry remained in the area is a legitimate
question that has not been satisfactorily answered. 53 In fact, the residents valued the presence of
industry and considered the aesthetic of the area essential to their identity and creativity:

There was no road (now Washington Boulevard)
from the Powerhouse to Newport … You could
hear the foghorns at night … The waterfront was
astoundingly beautiful---sandy shore, tumbleweeds
packs of wild dogs, view of World Trade Center
right in your face …Next to 111 was an open landfill
full of artifacts, like old bottles and glass. People had
metal detectors and would go scavenge … [The area]
was a chromium-filled wasteland. Men in white
suits would tell them not to dig in the earth …54
A fellow artist of 111 1st Street applied similar language to describe that area of Jersey City in
the late 1980s and early 1990s:

For the first year or two, what is known as Washington
Boulevard did not exist; it was mostly sand dunes that
were frequented by tumbleweeds, the occasional rabbit,
and feral dogs. Newport City was being developed …55
Another former resident quite graphically described the vicinity surrounding 111 1 st Street and
the neighboring warehouses:

[U]rban hell, cars on fire, mob dumped bodies there …56

53

The author wonders how to uncover this information. This would likely require reviewing past tax records and
business directories. Such resources might not be readily available.
54
Interview with author, June 18, 2011.
55
Interview with author, June 26, 2011.
56
Interview with the author, July 15, 2011.
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All the interviewed artists and residents spoke nostalgically, almost gleefully, of the
grime, the grit, the danger, and the decay of that area of Jersey City during the beginning of their
tenure at 111 1st Street. Gentrification scholarship and other academic and popular discussions
have long classified artists as chronically risk-oblivious to the selection of their workspaces and
homes. A large reason for this disposition is the overlooked fact that most artists fall into the
strata of the low-income and possess little disposable wealth. 57 Their existences are not as
glamorous and fancy-free as held by the public imagination. In her study of arts neighborhoods
in Toronto, Canada, Alison Bain supported such a statement by noting that “[t]he backdrop of
everyday life for [the] artist consists of violence, immorality and deprivation.” 58 However, this
only partially answers the question as to why artists glance longingly at buildings such as 111 1st
Street and locales such as Jersey City. What are their attractions?
In the public imagination, artists are synonymous with cities and the urban
landscape. 59 The association of the wild-eyed painter or brooding poet with cramped garrets and
narrow alleys was born in nineteenth century Paris and entered the American consciousness in
the polyglot streets of New York’s Greenwich Village in the opening decades of the 20 th
century.60 This Romantic conception found theoretical language first in Walter Benjamin’s

57

“In North America, the life of the artist is an invitation to voluntary poverty …” David Ley, “Artists,
Aestheticisation and the Field of Gentrification,” Urban Studies 40, no. 12 (November 2003): 2533.
58
Alison L. Bain, “Constructing Contemporary Artistic Identities in Toronto Neighborhoods,” The Canadian
Geographer 47, no. 3 (2003): 310.
59
Famous and influential exceptions to this relationship exist, such as Georgia O’Keeffe. Interview with Jessica
Murphy, Ph.D.
60
Richard Lloyd, Neo Bohemia: Art and Commerce in the Post-Industrial City (New York: Routledge, 2006): 52:
“In Paris, a variety of practical strategies and mythic associations of the modern artist coalesced, producing what has
proved to be a durable model of la vie bohème, elements of which can be identified in a variety of urban locales …”;
Ibid: 54-55 “… the Parisian prototype served as a model for action and self-understanding and self-understanding
actively and consciously incorporated into the lifestyle of the New York avant-garde, and further provided a frame
within which the loose aggregation in Greenwich Village has been and continues to be interpreted by others.” Ibid:
50-58.
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writings on Paris in his fragmentary, yet simultaneously encyclopedic Arcades Project.61 Other
scholars, including David Harvey and Richard Lloyd, built upon this characterization of the
bohemian as a child of the Paris of Charles Baudelaire and Eugène Delacroix.62 However, this
well positioned and widely accepted argument should not be taken as fact. Indeed, it should be
viewed with healthy skepticism. Artists, men of letters, and intellectuals have always gravitated
toward cities. In antiquity, philosophers, playwrights, and poets yearned to ply their trades in
Athens and Rome. The court, the church, and patrons lived in the city-states of Renaissance
Italy. Only briefly, during the Romantic Age, largely thanks to the lyrical lines of William
Wordsworth, was the city viewed as harmful to the imagination and creativity and was the
pastoral seen as the environment most salubrious to sensitive and reflective individuals. It is
worth noting that this Romantic conceit was far from uniform in the American artistic and
intellectual circles. The transcendentalist writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David
Thoreau closely followed the script initially penned by William Wordsworth in his preface to
Lyrical Ballads. However, nature is seen as a violent and destructive force in Herman Melville’s
Moby Dick, and Satan literally walks in the woods in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter.
Paris and later Greenwich Village belonged to historical symbiosis between artists and the city.
Paris was not a beginning, just merely another---albeit lively and fertile---setting and stage for
generations of artists. Cities and all their flaws and strengths are essential to the arts and artists.
Artists have always been and continue to be urban creatures.63 Jersey City and 111 1st Street

61

Walter Benjamin, “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” in The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and
Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1999).
62
David Harvey, Paris, Capital of Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2005); Richard Lloyd, Neo Bohemia: Art and
Commerce in the Post-Industrial City (New York: Routledge, 2006); Jonathan Seigel, Bohemian Paris: Culture,
Politics, and the Boundaries of Bourgeois Life, 1830-1930 (New York: Viking, 1986).
63
“[Artists] remain disproportionately committed to center-city living, even as center cities struggle to weather the
effects of economic restructuring. In fact, … artists are an especially fast-growing population in cities not
traditionally associated with cultural production, including Minneapolis, Cleveland, and Detroit. Bohemia, if
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belonged to this rich history and tradition that began in ancient Athens and stretches to the
current day.
By late 1990, the ownership and the management of the building appeared to be
marketing 111 1st Street solely to artists. A press packet dated November 6, 1990 and written by
said parties named the building “The Arts Center on First, Inc.” The release begins with an
emphasis on the almost spontaneous and mythical beginning of the 111 1 st Street as a magnet for
artists and then methodically touts the following assets: the concentration of artists (eighty artists
and artisans at that date), the variety of studios, 10,000 square feet dedicated to a future gallery,
the continuous twenty-four hour access and security, utilities and services, the nearby PATH
stations, and, of course, the site’s close proximity to the art capital of the world---New York
City.64 : The packet also contains an advertisement, likely for placement in magazine,
newspapers, and other print publications (See Figure 6).65 The emphasis on the attraction and
the retention of artists as tenants and residents figures prominently in the later history and the
final conflict over the fate of the building. The ownership---albeit in the self-promoting and
always suspect medium of a public relations notice---described itself as:

defined solely as an urban artists’ district, has only become more frequent in the postmodern period.” Richard
Lloyd, Neo Bohemia: Art and Commerce in the Post-Industrial City (New York: Routledge, 2006): 66.
64
“In the Spring of 1989 a local artist inquired if he could rent space to paint in … The first artist arrived and word
of mouth set other artists to the 100 year old P. Lorillard cigarette factory at 111 First Street …” “The Arts Are on
First,” Press release.
65
The discovery of this press packet and the accompanying advertisement is important in the history and the
comprehension of 111 1st Street. This fact cannot be undervalued. The author became fascinated by 111 1 st Street
after reading a brief article on the subject in a local magazine. Kate Rounds, “The Fate of 111 First Street: Artists,
Development, and the Destiny of a City,” Jersey City Magazine 6, no. 2 (fall/winter 2009/2010): 52-57. The article
noted that the lofts and studio space in 111 1st Street had been purportedly advertised in various publications,
including The Village Voice. None of the interviewed subjects attested to this statement. However, the existence of
this press packet provides credence to the statement. Also, any individual or group hoping to attract artists in the
late 1980s and early 1990s would have likely purchased advertising space in The Village Voice. A copy of this
crucial document is kept in the collection of the New Jersey Room at the Jersey City Free Public Library. This
project underscores the importance of public libraries and the preservation and promotion of local history and
largely forgotten moments.
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… arts oriented; though the opportunity came to them [the ownership
and management] unplanned, they are looking forward to all the
challenges and personal rewards that will be there in the future. It is
one project that New Gold and the city of Jersey City will take pride
in seeing through to fruition.66

In the early years of the building’s life as an arts community, the relationship between the
ownership and the artists appeared to be mutually respectful and beneficial, if not outright
symbiotic. When and how did this relationship decay into an antagonistic and destructive one?
A month earlier in October 1990, approximately twenty-eight artists housed in 111 1st
Street opened their studios and showcased their work in the Second Annual Artists Open Studio
Tour. (This tour continues to the present in Jersey City and recently marked its twenty-fourth
anniversary in 2011. As to be expected, the tour is now a more formal event and is organized
and funded by the county and municipal government and corporate, local businesses, and nonprofit sponsors.) 111 1st Street was the marquee of the tour, and a reported 1,500 people visited.
The mayor of Jersey City, Gerald McCann, toured the building and purchased art.67 The
successful turnout generated by the tour and specifically by 111 1 st Street stirred a feeling among
the ownership and the artists that the building could become a very special and significant space
for the local and possibly the national arts scene. 68 The owner of an art gallery on nearby Van
Vorst Park, Richard McAllister, expressed optimism for the then burgeoning Jersey City arts
scene:
66

“The Arts Are on First” Press release; Georgem Point, “An Arts Community Steps Into a Spotlight,” New York
Times, February 17, 1991.
67
Gerald McCann is one of many notorious, colorful, memorable, and ultimately shameless characters of Jersey
City and Hudson County politics. In his second and non-consecutive term as mayor, he was charged and convicted
on federal charges in savings-and-loan scam in 1992. Although barred from holding office, McCann remained
involved in local politics as a behind-the-scenes player. He won a seat on the Jersey City Board of Education in
2007 and subsequently lost his seat in 2011 to a reform ticket. Evan Sperick, “That Felon Inspecting Trash? He
Used to Be Mayor,” New York Times, October 7, 2011.
68
William Rodwell, Timeline: 111 First Street, Jersey City, NJ: 1866-2005; “The Arts Are on First,” Press release;
Georgem Point, “An Arts Community Steps Into a Spotlight,” New York Times, February 17, 1991.
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I just knew that if I built it [Van Vorst Art Gallery], people
would come … Until now, Jersey City has been thought of
as a poor stepsister to the Hudson County art scene … It is
time that Jersey City artists started getting more exposure
to the public through exhibits in their own community. 69
The presence of 111 1st Street undoubtedly contributed to this ebullience among the local cultural
class and initiated a clustering effect. As early as 1991, a reporter from the New York Times rode
the PATH train across the Hudson River to investigate and chronicle the nascent art scene,
wondering if the seeds of a new SoHo were germinating among the industrial decay of
Manhattan’s smaller sibling. Several galleries popped up and an estimated four hundred artists
honed their craft within walking distance of 111 1st Street.70
At roughly the same time, the ownership of the building changed hands in one of the
stranger and murkier episodes in the long, tangled history of 111 1 st Street. This change of
ownership may very well serve as a pivotal moment in the history of the building and a prime
mover in its eventual and lamentable demise.
The New Gold Equities Corporation signed a lease on 110 1 st Street and 111 1st Street in
October 1988 with an option to purchase both properties.

The real estate company was owned

by Steven Romer, an area businessman and attorney. In May 1989, New Gold contracted to sell
the purchase rights for $18.4 million. However, the deal collapsed over a $500,000 deposit
check, and New Gold filled a lawsuit against the would-be purchaser. These transactions
paralleled the marketing of 111 1st Street toward artists and the very crude rehabilitation of the
building for arts studios. New Gold and Romer exercised their claim to buy both warehouses in

69
70

Georgem Point, “An Arts Community Steps Into a Spotlight,” New York Times, February 17, 1991.
Ibid.
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the summer of 1990 for $11 million. Tracking down the origin of those funds revealed an
opaque and tangled record of finances.
By late 1990, New Gold and Romer were required to make two hefty interest payments to
an entity known as Bridgehampton Estates, “a company affiliated with a well-known Manhattan
real estate entrepreneur.”71 This “entrepreneur” was likely Lloyd Goldman, the property owner
with whom the residents and artists of 111 1st Street eventually clashed. New Gold and Romer
aspired to refinance their debts, allowing them to free up liquid cash, pay off the loans, and
renovate 111 1st Street. Romer personally shopped around for a deal to recalibrate the financing
behind the two buildings. He entered discussions with a Los Angeles-based development
company for a refinancing package worth $19.3 million and a multi-million dollar policy on
Romer’s own life. This deal failed to reach fruition.
On New Year’s Eve 1990, Romer disappeared with an estimated $15 million dollars of
clients’ funds. Romer surrendered himself at the offices of the Manhattan District Attorney on
February 25, 1991, claiming a representative of “X Corporation” had kidnapped him at a
stoplight in Queens on New Year’s Eve. Romer then somehow escaped from his captors and
went underground at an undisclosed location in the continental United States. Romer stated that
he had incurred the wrath of X Corporation when he attempted to start an electric car company in
the 1970s. For the next twenty years, this entity hacked into his bank and computer accounts and
siphoned away funds from his clients and his own personal interests. Romer suggested that the
X Corporation was indeed General Motors or General Electric. The prosecution under the aegis
of longtime district attorney Robert Morgenthau uncovered Romer’s involvement in gold mining
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in Sierra Leone and his supporting a West African mistress in a Manhattan apartment. A jury
summarily convicted Steven Romer on fourteen charges, including first-degree grand larceny. 72
Former residents of 111 1st Street recalled an even less tidy account of the events
surrounding the change in ownership of the buildings in the early months of 1991. Several
residents, in fact, spoke of running gun battles in 111 1st Street and the presence of mafia-related
goons during the tussle over the ownership. 73 One source summarized the events as such:
For a month following [Romer’s] disappearance, BLDG
Management, owned by multi-billionaire Lloyd Goldman,
moved in to protect its investment. (Goldman had lent
$400,000 so the absconded lawyer could buy 111 First and
110 First.) He sent three men to take over the office and
one of them had a hand gun. Two different "owners" were
now competing for our rent. This lasted several weeks until
it was resolved in court in Goldman's favor.74

Other sources offered similar suggestions of nefarious doings by the now warring management
firms. Events occurring later in 111 1st Street provide credibility to charges of criminal
connections or, at least, tolerance of a criminal element within the building. A news article
exploring the growth of a local arts scene in Jersey City made no mention of the weird and
scandalous events surrounding the change in ownership of 111 Street, merely noting that
Properties Management Company had recently taken over operating the building. 75 This marks
the only reference to this company known to the author: his research uncovered no other mention
of it.
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Rumor and possible tall tales aside, the disappearance and later bizarre resurfacing of
Steven Romer initiated a complete turnover in the ownership of 111 Street. Lloyd Goldman,
who lent large sums of money to Steven Romer to purchase 110 1st Street and 111 1st Street,
scooped up both properties in bankruptcy court in March 1991 for $3.4 million and then assumed
full ownership of the buildings.76 The ownership and management of the building was now
constituted under a corporate entity by the name of New Gold Equities.77

From a historical

perspective, the entrance of Lloyd Goldman as the primary owner of 111 1 st Street altered the
trajectory of the building.
Lloyd Goldman was and is one the largest and most powerful real estate moguls in the
New York City region with a portfolio estimated at $2 billion. When Larry Silverstein bid on the
lease on the World Trade Center in 2001, he looked to Goldman for funding. 78 The company
currently owned by Lloyd Goldman, BLDG Management, is one the most exclusive and works
with a select number of parties. In fact, an Internet search reveals no website for BLDG
Management.
An investor of Goldman’s caliber purchases property with likely both short-term and
long-term strategies to maximize profit. In the short-term, this strategy seemed to involve the
artists of 111 1st Street; however, in the long-term, far more money could potentially be reaped
from the redevelopment of the site than that generated by a tribe of hardscrabble bohemians.
Such a plan coincides with patterns observed by gentrification theorists of both supply-side and
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demand-side schools of thought and also proponents of the urban growth machine theory. This
conflict of values eventually ignited the battle between Goldman and the artists.
Oddly enough, the first years of Goldman’s ownership of 111 1 st Street were a
honeymoon period for both the artists and the landlord and for the overall artistic community of
Jersey City. New Gold Equities, in fact, petitioned the city government to alter the zoning of the
structure, changing its designation from a manufacturing site to artists’ work studios. This push
met with a warm reception from the municipal bureaucracy and zoning board, which
unanimously approved the application. The attorney for the ownership stated that 111 1 st Street
would be entirely converted to studios of various sizes and rented exclusively to artists. The
Jersey City planning director remarked that the zoning change and the artist colony were “step[s]
to bring the warehouse district back to life.” 79
Artists continued to view their place and their future in Jersey City with optimism and
excitement. Potential and possibility appeared to be the watchwords of the day. This period of
mutual enthusiasm and growth coincided with the resurgence of Jersey City, notably its decadesdormant waterfront, and the movement of artists to 111 1st Street and Jersey City must be viewed
within this context.
In the first half of the twentieth century, Jersey City stood as a hub of shipping,
transportation, storage, and industry. This rough environment found cinematic expression in the
1954 film On the Waterfront. Immigrants---mainly, Irish, Italian, and Eastern European--flocked to Jersey City and the surrounding cities and townships of Hudson County for plentiful
blue-collar jobs. The Irish began arriving in Jersey City before the Civil War and eventually
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dominated municipal and county politics reaching their apotheosis with the infamous Frank
Hague, who served as mayor from 1917 to 1947.80 Indeed, Irish-American politicians continue
to exert control over the Democratic machine---an astounding and impressive feat considering
their membership in an increasingly shrinking demographic (roughly 5.6% of the population).
Following the Second World War, Jersey City suffered a painful decline, following the pattern of
other older Northeastern cities. The population contracted and became poorer and less middleclass and less white. Once mighty factories such as Colgate, American Can Company,
Ticonderoga Pencil, and others shuttered. The railroad tracks fell silent and the docks rotted and
fell into the Hudson River. Jersey City seemed fated to become another Camden or Newark,
other formerly muscular manufacturing hubs written off by investors and elites and allowed to
slip into a long, painful, and often violent death.
In the mid-1980s and the 1990s, the prospects of Jersey City began to improve. Real
estate investors began to develop property along the waterfront, constructing an expanding
cluster of office and residential towers. Banking, insurance, and financial firms looking for
cheaper rents and new facilities looked to Jersey City to house back-end operations. Individuals
priced out of Manhattan and later Brooklyn discovered the PATH trains and bus routes providing
easy and reliable access to New York City. The 1990 census recorded the first increase in the
Jersey City population since approximately 1930. In 1992, Bret Schundler won a special
election to fill the mayor’s office, becoming the first executive not affiliated with the political
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machine in decades and the first Republican mayor of Jersey City since Mark Fagan in 1917.

81

Housing values ticked upward, city services improved, and taxes stabilized in this period as well.
Overall, Jersey City appeared to be moving away from the precipice and toward a sunnier future.
During this era, the artists of 111 1st Street, its ownership, and the municipal government
seemed to express unity over the goals and vision for 111 1 st Street and the surrounding
warehouse district. The city government prodded by local artists and a non-profit arts
organization, Pro Arts, discussed altering the zoning of the area and creating an arts district
encompassing the warehouses desired by artists and fellow travelers. 82 This project was named
Work and Live District Overlay (WALDO). 83
On June 26, 1996, the Jersey City council unanimously passed the zoning ordinance
creating WALDO, and Mayor Schundler signed the legislation on the following day June 27,
1996, thus, making the creation and promotion of the district the official policy of the zoning
department and the elected government. This legislation also created an artist certification board.
This board would serve as a peer review committee, determining whether applicants for
residency in WALDO were, in fact, practicing and professional artists.
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The ordinance demarcated a roughly seven-and-half block area as the new arts zone. The
WALDO district essentially mirrored the cluster of warehouses including 111 1 st Street, and the
borders of WALDO ran from Luis Muñoz Marin Boulevard to Washington Boulevard from west
to east and from Second Street to Morgan Street from north to south (See: Map 2). The
ordinance changed the zoning and allowed for arts studios and work/live studios in the
warehouses and buildings falling within the district. It also permitted arts-related retail, such as
art supply stores, galleries, and framing shops, performance spaces for theater, poetry, and dance,
and bars. However, the legislation sternly disallowed rock or music clubs. 84
These WALDO zoning ordinances served as an overlay to the preexisting zoning
designation, that is, industrial usage. The language of the ordinance clearly stated that property
owners could elect to continue to utilize buildings and land within WALDO for their historical
industrial uses. Likewise, owners could embrace the WALDO zoning and redevelop their
property for artists and art-related businesses. The city appeared to be devising a flexible and
multi-pronged development strategy: encouraging the development of the arts and the
development of property for that economic and cultural use and also providing property owners
with the option to retain and attract traditional industrial tenants. In fact, the ordinance allowed
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for owners to use a portion of a parcel for the arts and another portion for industry. 85 The Jersey
City planning director reaffirmed this strategy:
We don’t want to make [WALDO] too chi-chi … We want
to keep it on the funky side. So what goes in has to be
industrial strength: galleries interspersed with truck-loading
docks.86
The official formation of WALDO as an arts district and its structures as artists’ studios
and apartments appears to directly contrast with the deindustrialization and redevelopment as
observed by Zukin in SoHo and later by Curran in Williamsburg. At least at the origin of the
district, the city expressed a desire to retain an industrial economic base in the city and allow for
the reintroduction of industry and manufacturing. The city officials viewed the arts as a single
component of a larger economy---not a new, emergent economic sector supplanting an older,
contracting one.
The artists of 111 1st Street and the general artistic community of Jersey City expressed
both affinity and appreciation for the policies and the politics of Mayor Bret Schundler, who
served as the highest elected officer of the city during the 1990s, the WALDO discussion, and
the general détente between the arts, the ownership of the building, and the city government. 87
During his reelection in 1997, an informal artists group promoted and supported Schundler’s
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reelection bid and distributed flyers to hundreds of fellow artists attacking Schundler’s rival in
the race and touting Schundler’s accomplishments in the arts and culture sphere. 88
The stated policy stances of both Schundler and his rival, Jerramiah Healy, the current
mayor of Jersey City as of 2012, stood as interesting reversals of traditional party platforms and
public preconceptions of local and national parties. Schundler was and remains a Republican; in
fact, as he transitioned from a local political figure to a state politician, Schundler embraced a far
more conservative ideology and policy program, especially on social issues. Healy was and
remains a Democrat. He was an early supporter of President Barack Obama during the 2008
Democratic primary when a large and influential portion of the state party lined up behind the
candidacy of Senator Hillary Clinton. In his own reelection campaign of 2009, Healy slavishly
and somewhat humorously underscored his endorsement of Obama by airing footage of that
moment on a mobile screen mounted on flatbed trucks throughout the city.
However, on the issue of the arts and the government’s role in the arts, Schundler and
Healy expressed policy positions diametrically opposed to the generally accepted dogma of their
respective parties. Healy clearly stated in a candidate forum at the now-defunct Jersey City
Museum that the government should not support the arts. Later, he qualified that statement by
saying that “[t]here is nothing more opposite than artists and government. Government has
always been the [sic] anathema to artistic expression.”89 Schundler, on the other hand, listed his
88
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administration’s increased funding for the museum, its channeling of grants for mural art, its
organizing an arts summit, and its rezoning of the area around 111 1 st Street. Also noteworthy
was Schunlder’s rationale for promoting the arts and nurturing a local arts scene. Schundler
believed that “[m]aking [Jersey City] more beautiful through the sponsorship of public arts [was]
very important” and that the city should flaunt its vibrant cultural scene. 90 Schundler---at least,
during the heat of his reelection campaign---saw intrinsic value in the arts for their own sake. He
did not simply view arts as another cog in the economic machine or a tool to simply spur growth
and increase property values and tax ratables. Art imbued Jersey City with a sense of life,
attraction, and imagination. 91 This is unusually enlightened philosophical and policy position for
a politician of any stripe, especially a card-carrying member of the Republican Party, which
almost always seeks the defunding of the National Endowment of the Arts and Corporation for
Public Broadcasting after every national electoral victory.
During this period, 111 1st Street seemed poised to become the center of the arts
community in Jersey City. In addition to the occasional articles in the local Jersey City daily
The Jersey Journal, The Newark Star-Ledger, the premiere newspaper in New Jersey, and The
New York Times, several television stations broadcast stories on the community at 111 1st Street.
NJN aired a feature on the opening of a building-wide exhibition on November 24, 1995.92
Channel 11 New York broadcast a story on the development and state of the arts community,
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entitled “The New SoHo” on November 11, 1996.93 State of the Arts, a program on NJN
exploring the arts and culture of New Jersey, had a program on the studio tour of 2000 in the
autumn of that year, entirely focusing on the resident artists of 111 1 st Street.94 Several of the
artists profiled in the television news stories figured prominently in the organization of the
residents and artists of the warehouse and in the eventual struggle with its ownership. This
observation is noteworthy and raises several unanswerable, speculative questions. Were these
artists the most media savvy and, therefore, better positioned to interact with the city government
and the media during the struggle? Or, did these artists have the most to lose by vacating the
building and losing their somewhat elevated place in the arts community? 95
Former residents and artists painted a thrilling, seductive, and almost mythic portrait of
the action and activity contained within 111 1 st Street during this fertile, ebullient era. One artist
described the building as:
the epicenter of the art world in Jersey City … So cool, worth
checking out every year … One-half [of two hundred] artists
opened their studios---everyone tried to have better parties to
compete with one another … [There were] large, open studios,
parties, acrobats …96

Another past resident fondly recalled:
Cachet [of 111 1st Street grew] with the studio tour. Underground
parties drew people … People had parties to improve their space--rent parties … My roommate and I would rollerblade around the
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building until we found a party …Russians and Eastern bloc
immigrants threw the best parties … 97
One artist likened 111 1st Street to a de facto arts institution or museum:
It was an informal community that thru [sic] proximity and available
space functioned as a kind of unofficial arts institution. Because of
this, outsiders come to 111 the way they would gravitate toward
other institutions; they came to see the artwork, to fraternize with
interesting people, to be entertained by art, music, and other
performance.98

The words of another former artist captured the unique nexus of creativity and mystery within
the building:
Open any door along the warren of funky passages and you entered
another world: loft-size artists’ studios, workshops, live/work
residences, exhibition spaces, a yoga studio, a recording studio, more
than one small film studio, scenery and prop shops, mysterious spaces
filled with long-ago abandoned machinery of all sorts, and some places
where nobody was sure exactly what was going on.99
In certain ways, 111 1st Street resembled an artistic collective or commune:

The community was composed of artists who lived and
worked or just worked there. There were small businesses
such as wood shops or fabricators. There were film makers,
art printers, commercial photographers, computer technicians,
events planners, milliners, dress makers, stage production
fabricator, musicians, sound engineers, etc. Businesses often
collaborated or worked for each other. Some bartered services
or products. For many years it was a loose community where
people lived and worked together. Many were friends, close
friends or familiar to each other.100
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Other artists similarly described such a community-oriented environment, in which artists and
other residents were able to benefit and take advantage of the collective knowledge, skills, and
resources of their fellow tenants:
It was also a unique repository of technical information,
where I could find advice and assistance for almost anything.
I got to know many people who remain my friends to this day.
It was also a place to network, to organize, to sharpen your
skills, see the work of other artists, share information and to
publicize and find out about events in the arts community. 101
For one artist---and likely many, if not hundreds of others who passed through the mazelike halls of the building---111 1st Street allowed her to “100% pursue dream as a creative
individual in environment that allowed it.”102 Such a positive outlook appeared to be wholly
prevalent concerning the building, its community, and the Jersey City arts scene (and the city
itself in many ways) throughout the mid-1990s and until the early 2000s. The conditions---the
slow, yet steady press coverage, the public policy coming from city hall, the rapidly growing art
community and its increasing reputation---all seemed to foretell an intoxicating and propitious
future for 111 1st Street and its collection of ambitious artists and craftsmen.
So, what happened?
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Chapter 2:
Trouble Brewing: The Future No Longer So Bright
Unlike the plot of a novel or the storyline of a film, the path of history is rarely
determined by a single and solitary act, event, or moment. In our hyper-mediated age, it is
seductive to view and interpret history through the facile frameworks and melodrama seen in
television programs and popular films. However, history evolves within a shifting context of
human institutions and actors and unseen events. Economics, politics, technology, science, and
culture all impact the course of history arguably with the same force---albeit, often more quietly
and subtly---than a war or a shocking event. Historical changes result from a series or collection
of actions and figures. 111 1st Street must be understood within these parameters.
All the interviewed sources emphasized that the relationship between the building’s
residents and ownership soured and quickly become combative, even violent at times at the
beginning of the 21st century. No one could point to a single exchange or event as the turning
point or the source of the mutual animosity. (As written earlier, the switch in ownership from
Steven Romer to Lloyd Goldman in 1992 might be viewed as a pivot point---thanks to the
always immeasurable benefit of hindsight---but other factors played just as significantly into the
decay of the relationship between the ownership and the artists of 111 1st Street.) Something
changed dramatically between the years of 1998 and 2001. Accounts and news stories prior to
2001 all underscored and promoted the positive agglomeration of artists and antecedent growth
and renewal of 111 1st Street and its surrounding neighborhood.103 After 2001, new stories from
the same outlets and publications communicated growing pessimism among the artists and the
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residents and their increasingly insecure status with the management and ownership of the
building. As early as October 2001, newspaper stories reported on the artists’ dissatisfaction
with the management of the warehouse. Artists vociferously, if not hysterically, complained
about a threatened curfew for 111 1st Street, declaring that the building “seemed like the Utopia
for artists, but it’s like hell.” 104
Artists as a group and as individuals do not adhere to a strict nine-to-five regimen:
unorthodox work schedules and habits are often associated with a bohemian lifestyle. Whether
this popular romantic stereotype and image bear any reflection of reality is another question.
The majority of long-term successful artists in various forms and media (painting, literature,
music, etc.) exhibit an admirable work ethic and dedication to craft that requires creating art
throughout long, steady hours and stretches of time. 105 Nonetheless, a curfew imposed upon an
arts studio (or a vast complex of studios, in the case of 111 1 st Street) would stand as a great
deterrent to the production of art. Practically speaking, many of the artists working out of the
warehouse did not live on commissions and sales of their art: they maintained full-time jobs and
practiced their avocation in the evenings and on weekends. Another, an often underappreciated
reality about artisans and artists is that they are small businessmen. A curfew would directly and
quite negatively impact their ability to successfully function in that capacity. 106
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When the artists first raised an outcry over the possible curfew, the ownership wavered
over the implementation of said policy and explained the reasoning behind it as a safety issue:
We think that there may be some people there at night
who shouldn’t be, including people who may be living
there. It’s something that we’re going to try to stop.107
This sudden concern over residency requires closer examination. The ownership’s issue with
artists actually living in the building rather than simply using the space as studios---a direct
violation of the zoning for commercial property---was aired publicly for the first time in 2001.
In fact, the cited news article is the first mention in print of the ownership’s problem with illegal
residents in the building. For many years, the artists’ living situation in the building was an open
secret, if it was a secret at all. Many earlier news features on 111 1 st Street mentioned this
arrangement. More importantly, former residents attested to this fact:
Unspoken agreement [between the management and the residents],
couldn’t admit to living there. Owner installed sinks, bathrooms.
People had secret knocks. Fire inspectors always trying to catch them
[living in the building]. Secret walls to hide things. Artists from the
former USSR would say “This is not scary. This like Russia.” 108
Another former resident bluntly declared the ownership’s or, at the very least, the site manager’s
complicity in the illegal usage of the studios as residencies:
Goldman’s agent would build toilets and showers---proof of residency. 109
As the local media began covering the growing dispute between the ownership and the
residents, a general narrative developed and explained that the thorny question of the artists’
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residency and the threatened curfew sparked this increasing public argument. In reality, the
battle for 111 1st Street likely began several years early with a low, yet audible rumbling. In the
late 1990s, just as the city devised and later passed the WALDO overlay plan and as 111 1 st
Street and Jersey City itself seemed to radiate a tractor beam for artists priced out of Manhattan
and the more convenient parts of Brooklyn, New Gold Equities methodically began to weaken
the foothold of the artists in the warehouse. The expired leases of artists were not renewed as
early as 1999.110 By the winter of 2001, artists were not granted annual leases but month-tomonth leases, a contract far more beneficial to property owners than tenants. 111 New Gold
Equities also filed a legal challenge to an expansion of the WALDO ordinance---a fact that had
gone unreported during the spat of enthusiastic and positive articles on the new arts district. 112
The ownership of 111 1st Street specifically attacked the provision mandating fifty-one percent
(51%) of warehouse space in the district for artists’ studios.113
These facts alone fail to explain the seemingly sudden interest of the landlord in the
goings-on of 111 1st Street, his moves to curtail the number of artists residing or working out of
the former warehouse, and his apparent worry over the city’s interference in his management of
the property. Several other events---although seemingly ancillary---might have well contributed
to this changing position of New Gold Equities and the growingly volatile dynamic between the
ownership and the artists. A source interviewed by the author suggested as much:
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Big factors seemed minor … Stuff at the edges, just
as interesting …114
What was the “stuff at the edges”? What were these interactions, relationships, or events
unnoticed by the local press that altered the life of 111 1st Street?
In one possibly related event in 1999, the city government demolished a loading dock
behind 110 1st Street in order to widen 2nd Street and make that corridor and the adjacent
properties more attractive to development and prospective business. Presumably, eminent
domain was utilized to undertake this action. In addition to 111 1 st Street, New Gold Equities
owned 110 1st Street. The ownership claimed that the city acted illegally in their demolition of
the loading dock and initiated legal action against the city. Ultimately, New Gold Equities won
the court case and was awarded approximately $5,000,000 for the wrongful destruction of its
property. This settlement greatly exceeded the combined purchase prices of both 110 1st Street
and 111 1st Street by New Gold Equities in bankruptcy court in 1991. 115 This event more than
suggests a strain---if not outright antagonism---budding between the ownership and the city
government.
Moreover, this event---most likely not isolated---complicates the state-sponsored model
of gentrification as espoused by Jason Hackworth and Neil Smith. In the earlier stages of this
gentrification model, gentrification is a process largely undertaken by individual residents,
property owners, and investors, often without the knowledge and assistance of government
officials and institutions, banks, or corporate firms. As an area becomes more desirable and,
thus, more financially lucrative and reliable in the terms of profits, large, corporate bodies such
114
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as national and international banks underwrite investment or directly initiate projects in the given
area. Then, local and national builders and real estate firms swoop in and seize control of the
formerly small-scale or grassroots gentrification and transform the process into a massive, largescale, and formalized economic project. Such a change in the temperament, level, and dynamic
of the process is sponsored or even subsidized by the government at the local, state, or even
federal levels. This recent and contemporary phase of gentrification demonstrates a relationship
between capital and the state, a shared goal of spatial remapping, and an effective demographic
remaking of a neighborhood, area, or entire locality. 116 At the outset, such a process did not
appear to happen in the case of 111 1st Street.
The seizure and demolition of the loading dock of 110 1st Street by the Jersey City
government strongly hinted at a fracturing in the relationship between New Gold Equities and
the city. The city acted in this manner to widen 2nd Street for prospective and current retailers in
a recently constructed shopping center. This decision reveals that the city was deciding upon a
development policy---at least, in the vicinity of 110 1st Street and 111 1st Street---to make the
land usage and zoning agreeable and welcoming to retail and chain stores, even if that policy
negatively impacted private property owners. This occurrence also brings into question the
nature of the relationship between the ownership of the buildings and the city. According to the
gentrification theory advanced by Hackworth and Smith, the two parties should have been
working in tandem to ensure whole scale reinvestment and redevelopment of the properties.
This theoretical notion appears to be too simplistic when confronted with a specific series of
events and a specific case study. This model of gentrification becomes increasingly suspect
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when faced with the progressive conflict between the residents and the ownership of 111 1 st
Street. Finally, this clash between the city and the ownership demonstrated that New Gold
Equities possessed the resources, capabilities, and the will to challenge the city and win. Again,
this fact becomes increasingly important as the history of the building and its artists unfolds.
The relationship between the two parties at 111 1st Street underwent further tension in the
election of a new mayoral administration in 2001. In 2001, Bret Schundler concluded his second
and final term as mayor of Jersey City. Although supportive of culture and the arts, Schundler
was a classic urban booster.117 The mayor’s office aimed to fashion a pro-business and prodevelopment environment within Jersey City and presented the municipal government as a
willing partner in a local growth coalition.118 This general tenor altered with the election of
Glenn Cunningham. A longtime figure in Jersey City and Hudson County politics, Cunningham
ran his campaign on a populist platform and initially voiced support for 111 1 st Street remaining
an artists’ enclave.119 However, Cunningham’s position vis-à-vis 111 1st Street would become
more complex and difficult.
***
Various residents alluded to questionable or illegal activities occurring within the halls
and rooms of 111 1st Street: drug dealing and drug usage, prostitution, squatting, an immigration
ring, a sadomasochistic dungeon, and extortion at the hands of the building manager and
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superintendent. Most of these activities seemed to contribute to the allure of the building as an
outlaw bohemian environment and an alternative to mainstream society and culture; the
memories and recollections of such behavior seemed essential to the nostalgia of the building
and its community. This longing for grit and danger often exists as a key thematic ingredient to
most narratives of arts communities and bohemias. 120
A much more violent, although largely unknown, altercation might explain the sudden
concern over the safety of 111 1st Street by the owner and management. Previous artists and
residents hinted at a criminal element conducting business in the warehouse with the tacit
approval and possible assistance of the building manager. An episode threatened to bring this
explosive arrangement to the attention of the public and, more dangerously, law enforcement.
In 2000 or 2001, a fight erupted between two tenants of the building. One of the
combatants---a Russian immigrant---seriously injured the other party, or as a former resident
colorfully stated “beat the holy shit out of the guy.”121 In fact, the man suffered two broken legs
as a result of the incident. The injured tenant threatened to sue New Gold Equities for a lack of
security within the building. 122 One source stated that the injured man had been tracking the
activities of his Russian attacker.123 This man known as “Andre” was---if not a full-fledged
member---reportedly engaged with the Russian mafia.124 The building manager would rent
vacant space to Andre. In turn, Andre would sponsor Russian immigrants and lease the space to
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them. Whole Russian families began living in the building. More nefariously, Andre established
drug and prostitution rings in spaces within the warehouse. Presumably, Andre attacked and
injured the other tenant as a warning for him to keep quiet, mind his own business, and leave the
building.125
This unnamed man failed to heed the very loud and brutal message issued by the Russian
gangster. On July 4, 2001, Andre and at least one other criminal found the man and his
girlfriend in the halls of 111 1st Street and proceeded to make good on his past threat. Both the
man and his girlfriend were savagely beaten by the alleged mobsters. According to a news
report on the incident:
The [girlfriend] suffered a broken arm and nose, smashed
teeth, a cut to a bone in her left knee and crushed vocal
cords as she tried to protect her friend when the pair was
jumped … [She] was hurled down the stairs and her friend
suffered a serious brain injury. 126
Andre was arrested for the assault and beatings but was never indicted.
The details of this crime alone should have prompted a cursory investigation by local
authorities and by any responsive owner. The female victim was Katalin Pota, a minor actress,
who played the maid of Tony Soprano in the successful cable television drama The Sopranos.
This fact attracted local and national media attention to the crime and to 111 1 st Street. The
artists, mindful of their relationship with the building’s management and ownership and, more
importantly, desirous to continue living and working at the warehouse refrained from speaking to
the press and allowing themselves to become entangled in the brouhaha.127 Nonetheless, the
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attack and the subsequent spotlight shined on the building by the press might have contributed to
New Gold Equities’ sudden attention to the physical security of 111 1 st Street and the supposed
personal security of its residents.
Finally, the emphasis on security followed in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. This fact and its influence cannot be adequately judged or measured;
however, it must be considered when weighing the worsening atmosphere of 111 1st Street.
Several former residents or individuals intimate with the building mentioned September 11, 2001
during conversations with the author.128 Purportedly, Lloyd Goldman narrowly escaped death in
the World Trade Center due his late arrival to a meeting.129 Any examination of 111 1st Street
must take into account the widespread fear and sometimes paranoia---rational and irrational,
justified and unjustified---pervading all segments of the society immediately after the attacks and
lasting for several years.
The events detailed above formed a broader context and environment within which 111
1st Street existed. Inevitably, other elements and factors played into drama of the building and its
residents and artists; however, the ones examined feature prominently and are more widely
known. Ultimately, no historical or social event, moment, or even figure can ever be fully
understood, but the passage of time, dedicated research, and chance discovery might add further
complexity and richness to their interpretation and fixtures in the larger conscience and the
scholastic and popular imagination.
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Chapter 3:
111 1st Street: The Battle for Its Future
The threatened curfew and its damaging implications continued to alarm the artists and
residents, increasing their worries and fears over the intentions of the ownership, their
livelihoods and callings, and their very status and future in 111 1 st Street and Jersey City. In
2000 or 2001, the residents formed a tenants’ organization to increase their bargaining power
with New Gold Equities and to present a unified voice in such dealings and, possibly, to the local
media, government, and public. 130 One former tenant provided more detail:
In 2001, while I was busy curating my first art exhibition,
we began hearing ominous rumors that things at 111 could
be changing. We heard the landlord … was thinking about
demolishing the building and throwing us out. Our response
was to form a very loose "tenant's [sic] association" to see if we
could thwart the landlord's plans. When the rumors increased,
we got more serious and held elections for officers … For the
next 4.5 years, we did all we could to get public opinion on our
side, obtain the support of the local politicians …131
The tenants’ organization expressed a determination to the fight the proposed curfew. This
marked the first outright battle in the war over the future of 111 1 st Street.
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Although the management and the ownership of 111 1st Street originally warned of a
tenants curfew in October 2001, they now seemed to retreat from their initial stance, explaining
that a curfew stood as one of multiple options being explored to increase the security of the
building. However, their determination to impose a strict and---according to the artists---harsh
and punitive curfew seemed to arise again several weeks later. On November 21, 2001, a set of
rules and regulations was distributed to all the tenants throughout the building. These rules and
regulations explicitly spelled out when 111 1st Street would operate and function as a commercial
structure: the building would be open from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. on weekdays and 9:00 a.m. to
6:00 p.m. on Saturdays and it would be closed on Sundays and holidays. The new hours would
go into effect on December 10, 2001.132 Moreover, the memo warned:
Any individual found in the building after Dec. 10, after
the building is closed to the public, will be trespassing and
therefore subject to arrest.133
Upon initially hearing of the curfew in October, the artists voiced worry, emphasizing
their need to work at unusual times and hours. Many of the residents maintained second and
full-time jobs to supplement their lifestyle and vocation and they relied upon hours in the
evening, weekends, and the occasional holiday to work on their art. Such a rigid operating
schedule for 111 1st Street would obviously limit their studio time. Many of the long-term
tenants first signed leases in the building with the guarantee of twenty-four hour and seven-day
access to the building. Now, the management and ownership no longer limited itself to
constricting the hours of operation and effectively the ability of the artists to work: it raised the
threat of arrest and implicitly the termination of leases and residencies upon a tenant violating
132
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the newly published rules and regulations. 134 By posting such a memo, the ownership
fundamentally shifted its argument with the tenants. One artist labeled the curfew and its
accompanying threat as a “frontal assault.” 135
By late 2001, the artists of 111 1st Street and the tenants organization approached the city
government and pressed it to support them in the fight over the curfew and its harmful impact
not only on their livelihood and position in the warehouse but on the entire WALDO district as
envisioned and codified by municipal legislation and zoning. The Jersey City corporate counsel
received a copy of the original memo circulated by the management of 111 1 st Street and
remarked that the memo “caused concern in the [Cunningham] administration.” 136 Whether the
memo was provided by the management or the artists remains an unanswered question.
While the tenants’ organization began to maneuver the channels of government to broker
a solution between the residents and the ownership, some artists decided upon a more flagrant
and confrontational stance. On the night of December 10, 2011, when the curfew was to
officially be implemented, a group of artists flaunted the new policy and threw a nighttime party:
We’re going to throw a party … It starts at 10:00 p.m.
Monday night. There should be more than 100 people
there. Let ‘em arrest all of us. 137
Such expressed contempt for the proposed operating policy for 111 1 st Street and the authority
of the ownership most likely did not assist in the nascent negotiations between the tenants’
134
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organization and the ownership and did not place the artists in a good position with the city.
This lack of discipline within the ranks of the artists might have served as a dark harbinger of the
course of the struggle for the building and its ultimate outcome. However, aside from the ability
and the willingness to protest, did the average artist of 111 1 st Street possess any other strategic
resources?
Just before Christmas 2001, the tenants’ organization accompanied by their lawyer and
representatives of New Gold Equities met at city hall with mayoral officials. At this meeting,
these officials informed both parties that the Cunningham administration and, in effect, the
government of Jersey City, supported the arts community and the artists of 111 1 st Street and
urged both sides to amicably resolve the problems with the operating hours and security of the
warehouse.138 The attorney for New Gold Equities described the meeting as “positive” and
noted that “everything [was] on the table.” 139
Interesting enough, even at this early stage in the battle for what the artists would
characterize as the soul of 111 1st Street, the residents perceived that the essence of the fight was
for the overall character and future of their own building as well as the surrounding warehouse
district.
Several blocks away to the east, the Jersey City waterfront---a former shipping
powerhouse---was undergoing massive redevelopment (See: Map 2). Glittering office towers and
architecturally bland residential buildings sprouted with the regularity and fecundity of
summertime crops. To the west, the brownstone neighborhoods clustered around city hall and the
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Grove Street PATH were experiencing their own blend of gentrification. 140 The warehouse
district, rechristened WALDO, preserved the few remaining physical relics of Jersey City’s
industrial heyday and existed almost as an archaeological site of a way of life and a way of work
dimming in memory and history. 141 The artists viewed themselves as fighting to save these
remnants from the wrecking ball and the insatiable forces of “progress”:
It’s like the ‘Last of the Mohicans’ around here … The
developers and the yuppies are circling the wagons, and
I guess we’ll see what happens.142
This language deserves cursory examination. The imagery and words associated with the
American frontier chosen to describe the gentrification process unfolding in Jersey City match
the linguistic observations noted by Neil Smith in his studies of the East Village. 143 Nonetheless,
the meaning subtly shifted. In the case of Jersey City, the artists “settled” in the “frontier” long
before the developers and the more affluent classes appeared on the landscape. The artists---not
a minority or impoverished population---were the Indians or the savages to be rooted out, and the
developers and the affluent classes were the settlers staking claims on the land and cultivating it
for maximum and “proper” usage. However, in exchanges and interviews with the author, the
140
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former residents and artists described themselves as “pioneers.” 144 One individual intimate with
111 1st Street lamented the contemporary lack of such “pioneers” in Jersey City and other urban
environments:
Someone needs to be a pioneer. Pioneers crossed this
country. People need to take a chance. But, people just
want to stick in their own little area now. 145
This self-identification as both “native” and “pioneer” is an interesting paradox and stands as
unique to the context of 111 1st Street and Jersey City. 146
In studies of other artistic communities, artists flocked to a declining or dilapidated
neighborhood of a city and reinvigorated it. In this process, other populations and businesses are
displaced due to a combination of zoning changes, rising rents, and escalating property values.
Both the influx of artists and creative types and later public policy gradually yet effectively
pushed out industry from SoHo in Manhattan and from Williamsburg in Brooklyn. In the East
Village and Lower East Side of Manhattan, ethnic, immigrant, and minority populations suffered
the pressures of gentrification spurred by the original artistic “pioneers.” The discovery of
Wicker Park by Chicago’s artists led to the diminishment of Eastern Europeans and Puerto
Ricans in that neighborhood. These are only a handful of documented examples, and an
exhaustive list of such neighborhoods and their changing ethnic and racial dynamic and histories
144
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would demand more space than allowable in this discussion. (Admittedly, gentrification delivers
benefits to the members of such groups remaining in gentrified neighborhoods, and individuals
have expressed as much.147) One consistent fact exists in all such studies: the artists are
inarguably “pioneers” and typically the first wave of “pioneers.”
The case of 111 1st Street complicates this accepted narrative of gentrification and
corroborates the theory that all gentrification is partially local in nature. The artists and
residents of the building viewed themselves as “pioneers” of Jersey City, specifically of the
collection of warehouses surrounding 111 1st Street. Unlike most artistic colonies detailed in
gentrification literature, 111 1st Street did not initiate the displacement of other urban residents.
111 1st Street sat in a purely commercial or industrial zone of Jersey City. 148 No cold-water flats
or block upon block of railroad apartment buildings were located in the vicinity of 111 1 st Street.
As described earlier, several industrial tenants might have existed in the building or in the area at
the beginning of the influx of artists. (Unfortunately, the author has not been able to locate any
information on the number or the nature of such businesses. 149)
Within a decade, these “pioneers” of 111 1st Street became the “natives” or “savages” to
be pushed off their land by a more affluent population and the machinations of developers. How
does the usage of this language and imagery by the artists and former residents inform the study
and conceptualization of gentrification? In the instance of 111 1 st Street and Jersey City, the

147

Lance Freeman, There Goes the ‘Hood: Views of Gentrification from the Ground Up (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 2006). Freeman challenges the perception that minorities lose and lose big in gentrified
neighborhoods. He argues that gentrification presents some tangible benefits---better safety, cleaner streets, more
shopping choices---to the original inhabitants of neighborhoods. His study largely centers on Harlem, Manhattan
and Fort Green, Brooklyn.
148
This was also the case with the redevelopment of the Jersey City waterfront, now called the Gold Coast. Aside
from probable vagrants and criminals, the waterfront housed no residents.
149
An idea for future research would be to attempt to track down the businesses operating in 111 1 st Street and
within the area at the time of the movement of artists into the warehouse. Tax records and city directories might
provide some of the necessary data. This would likely prove to be a laborious and painstaking research task; thus,
the author decided not to pursue it for this discussion.

64

artists were the unruly population, the undeserving poor, or the suspect group scaring investors
and the wealthy away from the urban landscape. This descriptive language utilized by the artists
and their self-identification question the artists’ status within the gentrification narrative and
popular imagination as a privileged group. Artists as a group possess limited funds, influence,
and means. 150 In these aspects, they resemble the working-class and the poor---demographic
groups which are often victims of gentrification. However, unlike the working-class and the
poor, artists have a high degree of education and appreciation of culture. Additionally, artists
generally express a radical set of political beliefs and a socially and sexually libertarian
philosophy, setting them well apart from the middle-class and upper-class.151 This places them
in strange, almost neither-nor position. Artists straddle distinctive elements and classes within
American society. The vocabulary and language applied to the narrative and scholarship of
gentrification support such an observation---at the very least in the instance of 111 1st Street and
Jersey City.
Although the battle lines between the artists and the ownership of 111 1 st Street were
stiffening and becoming clearer, both parties appeared to be negotiating in good faith in the later
days of December 2001 and in January 2002. Following the suggestion of city officials, a
representative from New Gold Equities held a meeting with members of the tenants’
organization in January 2002 to discuss the prickly and difficult security issues. The tenants’
organization presented several solutions to address and partially solve the legitimate security
concerns of the ownership: an intercom system, a monitored elevator, and an artists review
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panel. 152 This panel would fully vet all rental applications and ensure that all future tenants were
indeed practicing and professional artists---and not floaters, partiers, addicts, criminals, or others
simply sniffing around for cheap rent. (As noted earlier, the building management was likely
complicit in much of the illicit activity within the 111 1 st Street. The building supervisor would
rent vacant units to various parties, presumably without the knowledge of New Gold Equities. 153)
New Gold Equities largely ignored these recommendations by the tenants’ association.
Instead, building management installed push-bar alarms on the two primary doors leading to the
main elevators of 111 1st Street. Presumably, these alarms would be turned on during the curfew
hours imposed upon the residents and the building and as established in the memo distributed to
the residents in late 2001; therefore, any resident or visitor attempting to break the curfew would
trigger the alarm system and alert a private security company or the Jersey City police. Hours
after the initial installation of the alarm system, the push bars were torn off the doors and thrown
on the floor. The building management reinstalled the push bar alarms several times, but the
pattern repeated itself. Although no tenants explicitly admitted to the sabotage of the alarm
system, the implication existed that the residents perceived the vandalism as an act of protest
against the management and the ownership. Soon thereafter, New Gold Equities stopped
enforcing the curfew. 154
While the residents and ownership of 111 1st Street attempted to forge an uneasy détente,
the Jersey City government under the Cunningham administration forged policy favoring artists,
the full implementation of the WALDO ordinance, and maintaining 111 1 st Street as an arts hub.
Although the city passed the WALDO ordinance in 2000 with much fanfare, press coverage, and
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goodwill among the cultural and arts communities, little movement occurred toward realistically
developing and, more importantly, securing the area as a functioning and vibrant arts district.
This problem continues into the present. Articles in the local press and comments on
local message boards often bemoan the lack of support for artists in the city’s arts district. In
fact, several sources interviewed by the author noted this glaring discrepancy between the stated
policy of the city government, the promotion of realtors, and the reality of the neighborhood
itself. One source bitterly remarked:

So called Powerhouse Arts District [formerly known
as WALDO], that we worked so hard to create, is just
another luxury high rise condo development whose
spaces are not user friendly to artists. 155

Another artist offered a more savage remark:

[The] only artists were exterminated …156

In contrast to the gloomy and defeatist opinions of the former residents of 111 1st Street,
government officials still argue that the arts are integral to the city’s cultural, social, and
economic future and describe the city as a partner and an advocate for the arts. 157 As late as
February 2011, the city voted to landmark the warehouses in the area surrounding (the now
former) 111 1st Street, reflecting a dedication to preserving the industrial architectural heritage
and carving out a space for artists and creative industries. 158
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Amid the rising tension between the artists and the ownership, the Cunningham
administration seriously attempted to craft a policy to manage the WALDO ordinance and settle
the future of the area and 111 1st Street. Cunningham sought and secured a $110,000 grant from
the state of New Jersey to contract the Urban Land Institute to interview residents and businesses
about the stalled WALDO neighborhood and produce a feasibility study detailing possible and
realistic plans for the area.159 The Urban Land Institute is a non-profit dedicated to the “open
exchange of ideas … to creat[e] better places” and “exploring issues of urbanization,
conservation, regeneration, land use, capital formation, and sustainable development.”160 Mayor
Cunningham justified the grant and the study by the Urban Land Institute:

While the formulation of plans for the district have
been handled in-house, we have sought outside counsel
to provide an unbiased view of the feasibility of our plans
for the WALDO area. 161

The city hoped that an outside study published by a third-party disengaged and independent from
the political squabbles of Jersey City and with no economic or personal interests in the
interpretation and execution of the WALDO ordinance might neutralize the issue of the district--and, possibly 111 1st Street---and allow all involved parties to accept the municipal policy and
finally move forward with needed development and investment.
The Urban Land Institute launched its study with a cocktail hour held in the lobby of one
of the newly constructed office towers along the Hudson River waterfront, hoping to introduce
interviews and exchanges with sources, the author never disclosed his volunteer position with the city to avoid any
possible conflicts of interest or to suggest that he represented the city in any way.
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the Institute to various constituencies in the city and to build a sense of goodwill around its
project. Participants in the study included artists, developers, planners, transportation officials,
and municipal officers, including Mayor Cunningham. During the launch party, the Institute’s
members assured their guests that the final report would be neutral in its methodology and its
conclusion. At the party, an artists’ advocacy group distributed shirts to the Urban Land Institute
advisors. This caused one guest, the former mayor, Gerald McCann, to remark that the
conclusions and suggested recommendations of the study were “pre-ordained.”162 McCann
offered a cynical, yet surprisingly insightful comment concerning 111 1st Street and the entire
WALDO district:

This was proposed six years ago and what do we have
after six years? Nothing. If you want affordable housing
you have to subsidize it.163

McCann was speaking about the mandate that fifty-one percent of the housing units in WALDO
was to be reserved for practicing artists. No subsidy was written into the original plan. This lack
of financial support for the arts and artists was a concern often voiced during the lifespan of 111
1st Street and it continues to be raised in Jersey City. The municipal government under various
administrations declared the integral position of fertile arts and culture communities within
Jersey City, yet the government offered a tiny amount in terms of financing and support and
wavered in its commitment in the face of developers and real estate interests. However,
McCann’s comments were rooted in his political rivalry with Mayor Cunningham and his
currying of favor with real estate interests---not in a spirit of altruism toward artists or in attempt
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to position himself as a stronger advocate for them. Years earlier, McCann defeated
Cunningham in Cunningham’s first run for mayor and now McCann signaled his support for the
interests of large property owners and developers over those of artists.
The Urban Land Institute released its report on March 10, 2002. The report concluded
that Jersey City should develop an arts district with a combination of market-rate and subsidized
housing, galleries, performance spaces, restaurants, and retail. Coincidentally, arts proponents
and the 111 1st Street artists had been promoting such a development plan for some period of
time, even preceding the codification of the WALDO district in 2000. However, the Urban Land
Institute offered an ambitious and optimistic strategy for the city. 164
In this plan, the historic Hudson & Manhattan Railroad Powerhouse listed on the
National Register of Historic Places and serving as the eastern border and landmark of the
WALDO district would anchor the neighborhood and be redeveloped into a multi-use structure
and arts and entertainment destination (See: Figure 7). The Powerhouse, constructed in 1909,
once generated the electricity for the PATH trains linking New York and New Jersey. In 2002, it
stood as a hulking, potent symbol of the postindustrial landscape of Jersey City. The report
urged the city to scrap WALDO as the name of the area and rechristen it “the Powerhouse Arts
District” in order to link it symbolically with the industrial centerpiece of the neighborhood. 165
Furthermore, the report tallied up the infrastructure resources of the PATH trains and HudsonBergen Light Rail and enviable demographics---35,000 employees and 80,000 residents---near
the district. Finally, the report noted the high concentration of artists in the New York City
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metropolitan, especially Hudson County and Jersey City (5,000 and 1,600 respectively in 2002).
As noted earlier, the development strategy of the Urban Land Institute advocated mixed-use
housing to preserve the arts community and to ensure that future artists might be able to afford to
live and work in the area. The Urban Land Institute supported this statement by detailing the
modest-income levels of artists in the metropolitan area (72 percent of artists in 2002 earned
$35,000). Such a small income would place most housing and studios beyond the reach of the
average professional artist. Although he presented himself as backer of the arts and 111 1 st
Street, Mayor Cunningham failed to appear at the public presentation of the Urban Land
Institute’s report.166
The involvement and the report of the Urban Land Institute adds another wrinkle to the
position of 111 1st Street within the gentrification narrative. Although a registered non-profit
often pressing for admirable development policies---smart growth and mass transportation, for
example---the Urban Land Institute is a creature of the real estate industry and a partner in the
urban growth coalition. Its report was embraced by the local arts community and the municipal
government, but the property owners within the Powerhouse Arts District neé WALDO took an
adverse stance toward the report. Specifically, New Gold Equities pressed forward with its
lawsuit over the WALDO ordinance and its restrictions over the development of 110 1 st Street
and 111 1st Street. This difference highlights some real cracks within the coherence of the urban
growth coalition theory and the supply-side school of gentrification theory.
Both theories paint the processes of urban development and gentrification with broad,
generalizing strokes, often categorizing various institutions, businesses, partners, and figures as a
monolithic bloc with an agreed set of goals. Essentially, full acceptance of these theories might
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very well lead to an absence of nuance and a denial of murky, grey areas in the interpretation of
gentrification and the capturing of specific, local narratives. In reality, any particular
gentrification movement is initiated, strengthened, abetted, and, if successful, finally cemented
by a unique coalition of factions and interests. The particulars of discrete a geographic location,
its inhabitants, and its economic, social, and cultural vectors are ignored if interpreted through
fixed lenses of a theory or an ideology. The supply model of gentrification remains especially
susceptible of such rigidity: the recent advances of this model by Smith and Hackworth are
especially guilty of such thought.167 The urban growth coalition---roughly paralleling the
demand model of gentrification, yet surprisingly undervalued, if not ignored by gentrification
scholarship---lumps together various factions as a coherent body working toward a singular goal
of development, growth, or gentrification, as well. 168 Such critiques do not question the value of
the supply model of gentrification or the urban growth coalition: both offer invaluable and
innovative insights into the structure of political coalitions, political economics, and, of course,
gentrification. However, both theories cannot sufficiently and satisfactory explain every instance
of gentrification. The tension among various participants (the municipal government, the Urban
Land Institute, and property owners and developers), often viewed as natural partners in supplystyle gentrification and the urban growth coalitions, in the case of 111 1 st Street and Jersey City
draws further attention to the fissures in the above theoretical structures.
***
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Following the release of the Urban Land Institute report, 111 1 st Street garnered little
coverage from the local media for the rest of 2002. 169 After much fanfare and public
commentary, none of the recommendations presented by the Urban Land Institution appeared to
gain any traction or initiate any legitimate policy discussions within the municipal government.
Additionally, the bickering between the tenants and the ownership of 111 1st Street appeared to
abate in 2002. Scant anecdotes or evidence offer a reason for this temporary lull in the battle for
the building.
In November 2002, 111 1st Street gained the unwelcomed attention of city officials after a
fire broke out in the studio of two artists on the warehouse’s fifth floor in the early morning of
November 2. As a result of the sprinkler system set off by the blaze, sixteen studios were
flooded, many artists’ work and belongings were destroyed, and the building and its studios
experienced water damage. The artists who accidentally started the fire suffered severe burns.
Following the blaze, inspectors from the Jersey City Fire Department visited the building on a
regular basis and attempted to prove that artists were living in their studios. As stated earlier,
tenants were expressly prohibited from living in 111 1st Street as the structure was zoned for
commercial usage. However, the ownership, the city, and the tenants played a game of mutual
self-denial: all parties knew that many tenants were living in their studios, and the local media
printed articles stating this fact. Nonetheless, the fire and the real threat that the flames could
have jumped to nearby buildings and could have caused the deaths of illegal tenants in 111 1 st
Street forced the city to act and to instruct the Fire Department to exercise enforcement
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measures. 170 The artists took umbrage with this action and perceived it as an intrusion by the city
and by extension New Gold Equities. In reality, the city could have levied heavy fines against
New Gold Equities if any artists were officially determined to be living in the building, and the
building itself was likely not up to current building and fire code standards, especially for
habitation. A source articulately placed the public safety issue in perspective:
If a warehouse in the Heights [a largely residential
neighborhood in the northernmost part of Jersey City]
was filled with undocumented workers, it would be
shut down in five minutes.171

Meanwhile, the temporary truce between the ownership and the artists continued--- in
public, at least, into early 2003. During this period, the artists expressed more concern over the
health of the local arts scene and the viability of the Powerhouse Arts District as an art nexus
than their status vis-à-vis 111 1st Street.172 The general optimism and energy previously
emanating from 111 1st Street and Jersey City seemed unfocused and weakening. A news story
embraced this theme:
[T]he buzz was that this could be Jersey’s answer
to SoHo … It never quite happened …173
An artist based in 111 1st Street echoed such a sentiment:

There are tons of artists here. The potential is all
here. Now we just need to connect the dots,
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somehow.174

Another artist remembered that critics from the New York Times would journey across the
Hudson River to review an opening or a show in 111 1st Street or a gallery in downtown Jersey
City in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Now, many of those galleries were closed, and the press
coverage had largely disappeared. The artist once thought:
Wow. This [111 1st Street and Jersey] is
really going to take off. But it’s sputtering
now.175

In 2003, Jersey City continued to attract the back offices of many financial and banking
institutions, and many of those businesses sponsored annual studio tours and displayed work by
local artists in their lobby spaces, yet this infusion of jobs and an influx of a more affluent
population did not coalesce into a community of art collectors or art connoisseurs. This problem
continues into the present:
People from New York City don’t come to see
Jersey City artists. Good artists have to show
in cities …176
Why were the cheer and headiness surrounding 111 1st Street and the local arts scene
siphoned off at that time? As several sources interviewed by the author mentioned, the arts
scene in Williamsburg, Brooklyn percolated roughly at the same time as 111 1st Street in Jersey
City in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. By the early 2000s, the bohemian image of
174
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Williamsburg had spread beyond the borders of the metropolitan area and began seeping into the
collective imagination of self-identified creative and counter-culture types.177 Williamsburg was
the ascendant bohemia; Jersey City remained in stasis, if not decline. Also, the regional and the
United States economy were far from booming in 2003: before the recession of 2008, the
economy under the presidency of George W. Bush was infamous for the weakest growth in
postwar United States. At the local level, the vacillating policy and erratic support for the arts by
the Jersey City government could not have helped. Ultimately, no scholarship can ever prove
why one bohemia explodes while another withers away. A certain intangible, organic element or
compound exists in the growth of an artistic community, just as in the creation of art itself.
Later in 2003, the energies of the artists shifted away from the overall health of the arts
scene and returned to their hold on the building itself. New Gold Equities began raising the rents
of artists at an unspecified point that year. The exact date of the rent increases remains
uncertain. Since the residents held individual leases (some of the leases were month-to-month;
others were annual), the rent changes most likely did not fall on a uniform date. All the tenants
received notices of rent increases ranging from 50% to 200% by September 2003, and the local
press began reporting on the increases in February 2004. Interestingly enough, New Gold
Equities delivered notices of rent increases to the tenants in late 2002, but the Cunningham
administration quickly intervened and forced the owner to retract the announcements. 178 A
source elaborated on the seemingly sporadic, but obvious strategic move by the ownership to
periodically threaten astronomical hikes in the monthly rents of the artists of 111 1 st Street:
177
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Goldman would double, triple the rents. The mayor’s
office would pressure him. Goldman would back off
and then again raise rents a few weeks later. War of
attrition against the city and the artists …179

The above is revealing and direct in its meaning. New Gold Equities and Lloyd Goldman
pursued a clever, tested, and often successful strategy of property owners and moneyed interests
in the exploitation of land and buildings in gentrifying or gentrified areas and neighborhoods:
regularly escalate the rents on long-standing and low-paying tenants, frustrate those tenants with
legal tactics, retreat if pressed by government offices or officials, and then return to the original
plan with a steady, savage determination. The tenants will eventually vacate, leaving the
building empty and ripe for redevelopment and a massive return on the initial investment. In the
case of 111 1st Street, New Gold Equities perceived its back-and-forth with the artists and, to
lesser degree, with the city as a component in a forward-thinking plan. The artists might get
discouraged and they might even win a few rounds, but, ultimately, New Gold Equities
possessed an enviable and seemingly infinite amount of resources in terms of funds, personnel,
and legal and financial expertise. In the long run, the ownership believed that it would win.
However, the sudden and dramatic rent raises attracted the attention of the municipal
government and local politicians. Assemblyman Louis Manzo voiced strong support for the
artists of 111 1st Street:
How can you allow 200 percent rent increases?
… The approach of having an arts district has
been a plus for the city, but one thing you need
for an arts district is artists.180
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Manzo vowed to research New Jersey state law and hoped to find a method to resolve the rent
issue in favor of the artists. Nonetheless, 111 1st Street was technically a commercial structure,
and its residents were legally commercial tenants; this allowed the ownership to skirt rent control
laws, and the tenants lacked their protection.181
The head of the Division of Cultural Affairs of Jersey City contributed the growth of the
arts in Jersey City directly to the concentration of artists in 111 1 st Street and seemed confused
by the actions of the ownership:
[Goldman] should be proud. He’s got some
of the best known professional artists in the
tri-state area.182

Mayor Cunningham had lobbied the owner to refrain from such large increases in rents
and had requested that the owner hammer out a permanent resolution with the artists;
nonetheless, as the tenor grew shriller between the parties, Cunningham felt more public pressure
to address the matter. Specifically, Cunningham was forced to publically disavow a past primary
supporter and fundraiser of his 2001 mayoral bid and 2003 state senate bid. At one point in the
increasingly public fight over 111 1st Street and, to lesser degree, the development ordinance for
the Powerhouse Arts District, New Gold Equities contracted Matt Burns to represent them in
their suit with the city government. Cunningham released a public relations statement in which
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he expressed his disagreement with Burns over 111 1st Street and “that he would try to help the
tenants.”183
Talk of partial or full demolition of 111 1st Street also reemerged in 2003. This belief
was rooted in far more than paranoid rumors and fears. In July 2003, the tenants’ association
and several other interested parties met with Lloyd Goldman in his Manhattan offices. Goldman
revealed computer-generated plans for both 110 1st Street and 111 1st Street. 110 1st Street would
be completely demolished, and a seventeen-story apartment complex built on the site. The plans
for 111 1st Street called for the demolition of a five-story section that bisected an inner courtyard
and the iconic hundred-eighty foot chimney of 111 1st Street (See: Figure 9). The chimney of
111 1st Street was an architectural feature treasured by the artists and residents as an emblem of
the past industrial might of the warehouse and Jersey City, and many sources interviewed by the
author fondly remembered the chimney and its prominence in the physical memory of the
building. After gutting the interior structures and courtyard of 111 1 st Street, the proposed plan
would have constructed a twenty-four story apartment building. All the artists and tenants would
be forced to vacate the premises during the demolition and construction and allowed to return
after the completion of the new structures and the renovation of the outer sections of the
warehouse. Goldman asked the tenants’ association to accompany him in lobbying city hall to
accept his plans for the two properties. The associated declined. 184
The year began with little discussion over the position of the artists in 111 1 st Street and
then quickly descended into a scramble set off by a cruel threat of a hefty increase in rents. As
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2003 grew older, the artists confirmed their worst fears: New Gold Equities not only wanted
them out of their studios and their homes---it connived to destroy their sanctuary from the world
and their artistic Eden. The final battle in the war for the soul of 111 1 st Street drew near.
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Chapter 4:
The Dying Days of a Dream

By the beginning of 2004, the tenants’ association and the artists had realized that Lloyd
Goldman intended to develop 111 1st Street and that their community would become collateral
damage in his plan for the building. Goldman, constructing a long-range strategy for the
property, perceived time as a reliable tool. He even reminded the artists that “time [was] still on
his side and he could wait out all politicians.” 185 As far as Goldman and his company New Gold
Equities were concerned, the artists had served their usefulness: 111 1 st Street, long a derelict
parcel of land in a largely abandoned swath of a moribund city, was now a valuable property in a
bustling neighborhood in a city undergoing a renaissance. The artists had played a crucial role in
the transformation of the Powerhouse Arts District from a grim, slightly terrifying cluster of
warehouses and crumbling industrial relics into a center of investment, construction, and new
housing. A source connected to the county government clearly stated as much:
Would developers [have] invested in high rises and sold/
rented to tenants if there was not the cachet of a local arts
scene?186
One past resident of 111 1st Street offered an eloquent and precise explanation of the process
occurring at the building and within the surrounding area and other sizable areas of Jersey City:
The pattern is a familiar one to artists and real estate
professionals. A bodega, a café, a bar, a restaurant, art
galleries, maybe a frame shop, an art supply store, a
hardware store. The neighborhood acquires an artsy
cachet, becomes trendy, and the gentrification begins.
Meanwhile artists, small businesses, local residents and
185
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landlords benefit from the new growth. At the other end
of the cycle the real estate speculators take over, property
values, taxes and rents begin to soar, and the artists are
priced out of their own neighborhood, they leave for more
affordable studio space and the cycle begins anew
somewhere else.187

The artists had worked and lived in the building for over a decade and they clearly
understood that they were unlikely to reap the benefits of the improving neighborhood. The
artists were tenants: they had not purchased the building, slowly improved it over an arduous,
often frustrating period of years and patiently waited for the neighborhood to better and for the
superior shops and services to arrive. The artists rented studios for genuine work and for illegal
living. The artists were outsiders, misfits, not respectable businessmen or buttoned-down
homeowners. However, they felt that 111 1st Street was their home, their urban village, and their
extended community. The cavernous, jumbled warehouse belonged as much to them---if not
more---than to a corporate entity housed in a Manhattan office. To the artists, 111 1 st Street was
not a line on a spreadsheet or a canny investment: 111 1st Street was a magical place, a creative
Eden, an epicenter of creation untainted by the cares and vagaries of the world. One artist
described 111 1st Street as a “miracle, blessing, phenomenon” and believed that “something
opened up and allowed us to be [there].”188 To put it succinctly, the artists had found and created
something amazing in 111 1st Street, and they would not easily give it up. Although the odds
were against them, the artists of 111 1st Street vowed to fight the ownership for the building.
Really, what other choice did they have? Walking away from their colleagues, their friends,
their homes, and their art was never an option.

187
188

Interview with author, June 30, 2011.
Interview with author, June 18, 2011.

82

The artists of 111 1st Street began to nurture their own plans to compete with the cookiecutter proposal being shopped around by the building’s ownership in late 2003. The artists
represented by the tenants’ association searched for an investor to purchase the building from
New Gold Equities and redevelop it according to the Powerhouse Arts District guidelines while
remaining cognizant of the needs and desires of the current tenants. Meanwhile, the artists
designed their own blueprint to retrofit 111 1st Street.189 They pitched their plans to Mayor
Cunningham and compared them to the computer model revealed by Goldman to the tenants’
association. Unfortunately for the artists, Cunningham expressed admiration for Goldman’s
plans for the building, asking “How come nobody ever showed me these plans before?” 190 The
group also sent their proposals to the respective directors of the Housing, Economic
Development, and Commerce and City Planning Departments of Jersey City, but the group never
received any response. Undaunted by the inconsistent support coming from city hall, the artists
and the tenants’ association continued to contact architects, engineers, and other real estate
professionals to build a rival confederation to purchase 111 1 st Street from Goldman and then
more sensitively and aesthetically develop it.191
How to explain or interpret the rather lukewarm reception by figures in city hall to the
artists’ redevelopment ideas for 111 1st Street? Obviously, there was no love lost between the
city government and the ownership of the building. New Gold Equities fought against the
WALDO ordinance and later the execution of the Powerhouse Arts District plan drawn up by the
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Urban Land Institute. Other property owners pushed against these zoning regulations as well,
but none as vociferously and steadfast as New Gold Equities. Also, in the past, the city
government, especially under the Cunningham administration, typically sided with the artists in
disputes and pressured New Gold Equities to resolve such disagreements amicably. What
changed the dynamic?
One source pointed out that the artists engaged themselves in local politics as the fight for
111 1st Street grew more intense, more volatile, and more crucial to their future in the building.
Some of the artists invited unspecified enemies of Mayor Cunningham into the debate and
involved themselves in issues unrelated to the building. 192 For instance, one artist wrote a letter
to the Jersey Journal lambasting a bond issuance being pursued by Cunningham and city hall.
Due to such interference in Jersey City politics, Cunningham placed 111 1 st Street on the
backburner. The source further corroborated:
I always warn artists about staying out of politics.
Politicians will always help constituents. But if they
view you as a rival, a combatant, they’ll destroy you.
Politics is a bloodsport in Hudson County. 193

The attempt of the artists to become actors in this brutal, internecine environment revealed a
certain degree of naiveté and ignorance regarding the realities of the political world. The
politicians of Hudson County earned their collective reputation as a hardnosed, merciless, and
sometimes corrupt bunch well over a century ago. Confronting them without tact, nuance, and
respect remains a perilous and foolish endeavor.
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However, by the spring of 2004, Mayor Cunningham and his administration understood
that their personal engagement in the struggle over 111 1 st Street was essential to the ability of
artists to continue to work and tacitly live in the building. Other ambitious politicians exploring
the issue also likely rekindled the administration’s interest. The dramatic escalation in rents and
the likely resulting departure of many tenants sparked Cunningham’s reappearance as an
advocate for the artists and an arbiter between the parties. Cunningham affirmed his support for
the artists of 111 1st Street and his goal of fostering a compromise between the artists and New
Gold Equities:
The artists have helped change the image of Jersey
City. My goal is to protect [them]. We need a thriving
arts community to fulfill the promise of Jersey City …
I’m looking at some means of compromising, so the
owner can do good things … but so the artists who are
there are protected …194

The director of the (now defunct) Jersey City Museum validated Cunningham’s statement
concerning 111 1st Street:
… [T]here’s no concentrated location like the 111
building. It’s where all the action is occurring. It’s
the point of reference for the arts community, from
where everything else flows. Everything. 195
The Cunningham administration and its allies did not wish for the destruction of the city’s most
known, revered, envied, and productive arts community to occur during their tenure and keep.
The threatened and much feared higher rental rates were scheduled to begin on May 1,
2004. Many of the artists knew that they lacked the financial ability to pay the increased rents
194
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for their loft and studio spaces. In order to attract a public audience to their predicament and to
galvanize the public’s attention and support, the artists organized a May Day Festival on May 1,
2004. During the festival, forty of the artists’ studios were opened to the public for self-guided
tours, and artistic workshops and musical performances occurred throughout the circuitous halls
and nooks of 111 1st Street.196
The selection of May Day as the date of the festival bears further scrutiny. May Day,
also known as International Workers’ Day, is a worldwide holiday celebrating labor unions and
the labor movement throughout Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Central and South America
and commemorating the Haymarket Massacre in Chicago, Illinois in 1886. 197 By setting the
festival and their public protest over their rental increases on that date, the artists identified
themselves as belonging to a militant labor movement---and largely working-class tradition of
dissent. Workers of the nineteenth century fought for safe working conditions, humane hours,
fair wages, and basic respect and dignity in the workplace: the artists of 111 1 st Street fought not
only for the right to a specific space but for the right to belong to an evolving cityscape and for
the very survival of their community.
The May Day Festival at 111 1st Street again underscores the perplexing place of artists
in the larger gentrification movement. Artists are straddlers of sorts. 198 Although they are welleducated and cultured as a social group and as a profession and they possess enviable reserves of
cultural capital, artists very rarely earn large incomes. In fact, most artists just cling to the lower196
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middle-class or the working-class rungs on the economic ladder. According to economic
measurements, artists belong more to the working class than the middle class and may be even
more vulnerable to the forces of gentrification than the lower classes. Lower-class residents
living in public housing, receiving Section 8 vouchers, or facing the threat of higher taxes are
protected by legal precedent and court rulings, government authorities and institutions, tax
subsidies, and various public interest groups. However, artists are viewed by the general
population as privileged and able to absorb new financial demands. This perception bears little
resemblance to reality.
In the case of 111 1st Street, the artists clearly identified themselves as members of the
American working class and successors to a leftist, pro-labor movement. They perceived
themselves to be a marginalized, vilified group just as labor organizers were in the Gilded Age
and continue to be in many corners of the public sphere in contemporary America:
[We were] portrayed as crackpots and freaks …
… [We were] fighting for our innate rights to be
who we were and not be prosecuted for it …
time of Bush and with us or against us.199

The following months witnessed another event precipitating an unfortunate turn in the
fight for 111 1st Street. On May 25, 2004, Mayor Glenn Cunningham died of a massive heart
attack. As earlier discussed, Cunningham was a supporter of the artists of Jersey City and had
built a tenuous alliance with tenants of 111 1st Street. Although irritated by the engagement of
the tenants’ organization in the larger political sphere of Jersey City and Hudson County,
Cunningham publicly expressed support for the artists and fought New Gold Equities for their
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right to remain in 111 1st Street. Cunningham crafted public policy aimed at building an actual
living arts community in the Powerhouse Arts District and he hoped to preserve a piece of the
landscape of Jersey City for the arts and for artists. Such an accomplishment would have been a
remarkable public legacy. At the time of his death, Cunningham was quietly negotiating leases
for the artists with Lloyd Goldman and New Gold Equities. When Cunningham died, those talks
ended. The untimely and sudden death of Cunningham resulted in the loss of the most powerful
and influential advocate for the artists of 111 1st Street:

Cunningham died and 111 went into freefall and
[it was] down in a few months. 200

At the moment of Cunningham’s passing, few realized that the ultimate fate for 111 1st
Street was effectively predestined. In fact, many of the artists and tenants believed that they had
found a much more vocal and muscular supporter in Acting Mayor L. Harvey Smith. 201 (After
Cunningham’s death, the Jersey City Council President, a popularly elected official, ascended to
the mayor’s office until a special election could be held in November 2004. The Jersey City
Council President seat was then held by L. Harvey Smith. 202) At a summer rally-cum-festival in
the grounds in front of city hall, Smith voiced his solidarity with the artists of 111 1st Street:

You guys are like cats. You have nine lives.
111 First Street is going to live. You can count
on it and you can count on me.203
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Earlier in the summer of 2004, the city council under the leadership of Smith introduced
ordinances to designate the Powerhouse Arts District as a historical district. Smith and his allies
in city council also began discussing exercising eminent domain to acquire 111 1 st Street and
preserve it as an arts community. 204
However, a source involved with 111 1st Street from its beginning to its end as a public
policy issue questioned the eminent domain strategy:

Smith wanted to showboat and tried eminent domain.
[I] talked to him about [the perils of] eminent domain,
but [he] was uninterested. Goldman had history of
beating eminent domain and knew the system. 205

As acting-mayor, Smith was essentially campaigning for a full-term from his first day in office.
He needed to make a quick and memorable impression upon the electorate and develop a citywide base for the coming November special election. Courting the arts community and fighting
for 111 1st Street allowed Smith to pursue these goals and could have provided him with a fullterm as a mayor. This circumstance might explain Smith’s more confrontational and risky
strategy of embracing eminent domain and siding foursquare with the artists of 111 1st Street.
As an interesting side-note and insight into the complex, opaque world of Jersey City
politics, the public voice for eminent domain was Councilman Junior Maldonado, who
represented Ward E, which includes the downtown, the waterfront, and the Powerhouse Arts
District. In 2005, Maldonado was defeated in his reelection bid by newcomer and perceived
reformer Steven Fulop. Fulop and his supporters presented themselves a good-government
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types, standing as a counterfoils to the entrenched political establishment and its ties with
developers and real estate interests, essentially the bulwarks of any urban growth coalition.
(Ironically enough, this downtown contingent benefits handsomely from rising real estate prices
and fits the classic definition of gentrifiers.) However, during the later stages of the struggle for
111 1st Street, Fulop was building his political organization and honing his public image. As a
political candidate, he would benefit from the demise of 111 1 st Street. If 111 1st Street was
saved, his opponent Junior Maldonado would gain a political advantage, an exceptional talking
point, and the support of the arts community. A source elaborated:

Fulop worked out of the Butler Building [near 111
1st Street], watched 111 collapse and didn’t intervene.
He could then enter office and look like a good guy. I
saw Fulop after he was elected. I said “it’s Xmas and the
heat is turned off.” He [Fulop] just nodded. It wasn’t his
problem. It was Junior Moldonado’s. 206

In 2011, Fulop announced his candidacy for mayor for the 2013 election.
Meanwhile, Lloyd Goldman and New Gold Equities moved to fully control the physical
space of the warehouse and exert more pressure upon the tenants and artists. This goal of firmly
and wholly securitizing 111 1st Street and monitoring its tenants began with the curfew; however,
the ownership greatly elevated its force and scope of this goal in 2004. As relationships and
negotiations between the three parties, the city, the ownership, and the tenants, frayed and
ultimately tore, New Gold Equities hired off-duty Jersey City police officers to patrol the interior
and the perimeter of 111 1st Street on a twenty-four-hour basis in the summer of 2004.
Suddenly, tenants found themselves forbidden from entering the courtyard and the roof under the
threat of arrest. Secondary entrances were sealed off, and all visitors and residents had to enter
206
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the building by the main door on 1st Street and sign in upon arrival. Privately-contracted
security guards manned the 1st Street door and tracked all movements of guests and tenants.
This security arrangement calls into question the stance of the city government as a
neutral party in the continuous dispute between the artists and the ownership and its periodic
claim as a supporter of the artists and their community. Off-duty police officers serving as
security at constructions sites, banks, carnivals, and other operations is a common sight in Jersey
City. In the case of 111 1st Street (and often in the aforementioned instances), these officers are
in full uniform with badges and department-issued firearms. An off-duty police officer holding a
second-job in security is not uncommon. However, most municipalities forbid an officer to wear
his uniform in this role. The uniform represents the power and the authority of the police force
and the local government. A uniformed police officer stands as a symbol of the government and
its monopoly on justice, punishment, and violence. By allowing off-duty officers to “protect”
the interests of the owner of 111 1st Street, the municipal government may have expressed its
priorities regarding the building, the owner, and the artists. Generally speaking, off-duty officers
guarding real estate projects and financial institutions demonstrate the city’s allegiance to such
interests and businesses.
This emphasis on security and safety at the expense of individuals is a common theme in
gentrification studies. Neil Smith documented this effect in his in-depth research on the East
Village. 207 Several scholars have noted this problem in their respective studies of Toronto. 208
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Also, the concept of the state---in this case, the Jersey City police department---abetting or
working in concert with developers or private interests to chide or force out undesirable elements
and populations is an emerging process associated with the neo-liberal state as defined by its
critics. 209
In the case of 111 1st Street, the association between the police and the ownership
understandably brewed suspicion and controversy. One artist offered his thoughts on the
presence of the police at 111 1st Street:

[The] police wore uniforms, harass[ed] artists,
got kickbacks and [were] able to talk to their
girlfriends on the phone.210

Another artist remarked upon the ambiguous position of the police in relation to the building.
The off-duty officers were purportedly hired to secure the physical site of the building and to
protect the personal safety of its tenants. Nonetheless, when a tenant approached a police officer
about a potential issue or problem, the officer “would say that he was off duty.” 211 The artists’
complaints over the supposedly off-duty police would increase and would largely prove to be
justified during the course of the year.
As detailed earlier, following the death of Glenn Cunningham, the city government
announced its intention to explore and exercise eminent domain in order to purchase and secure
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111 1st Street. The city informed all property owners in the Powerhouse Arts District that the
city planned to landmark not only 111 1st Street but also the other industrial sites and warehouses
clustered in the district. New Gold Equities began the demolition of 110 1st Street within days of
learning of the city’s policy intentions. 212 It remains uncertain whether New Gold Equities had
secured the proper authorization and permits to start demolition of 110 1 st Street at that time.
Following the August rally in front of city hall and the support voiced by various public
officials, New Gold Equities purchased a full-page ad in the Jersey City Reporter, a weekly
newspaper owned by a county-wide publisher, in the format of a letter signed by Lloyd
Goldman. In this letter, Goldman noted his company’s and his own long-standing commitment
to the arts and to Jersey City and touted the construction jobs which would be created by the
redevelopment of 111 1st Street. This reasoning is a tested tactic in peeling away labor for any
coalition attempting to rival the urban growth model. Goldman claimed that his company had
been operating at a loss on the property for some time and that a redevelopment of the property
would be necessary for its long-term viability and its continual ability to serve as commercial
site, that is, a collection of studio spaces. Goldman stated that the current tenants would need to
move elsewhere within the structure during construction, but that they would not be forced to
leave. The most revealing sentence in the letter reads:
The building itself needs extensive investment and
we propose to fund that investment by redeveloping
the core of the property as new residential space at
current market rates.213
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Did 111 1st Street require physical improvement? Most certainly, yet New Gold
expressed little interest in improving the space until the real estate bubble grew on the Jersey
City waterfront and the surrounding area. Essentially, the property would now furnish New Gold
Equities with a far greater return on its investments by wholesale redevelopment and attracting
much more affluent tenants than by allowing the building to crumble and renting it to ragtag
artists. This pattern fits the rent-gap theory as developed by David Harvey and Neil Smith. 214 In
attempt to garner public support for its project, New Gold Equities inadvertently revealed its true
goal: money. The artists were simply a mechanism in maximizing an initial investment.
In October 2004, the elected officials and certain elements of the professional staff of the
Jersey City government appeared to coalesce behind the artists and the movement to preserve
111 1st Street as a community, a physical structure, and a vital piece of the city’s architecture and
history. The city council unanimously voted to landmark the building and later followed with
another unanimous vote to adopt the Powerhouse Arts District plan in early October. This plan
designated that all structures falling within the Powerhouse Arts District be rehabilitated and not
demolished and that all projects and new construction emphasize the attraction and retention of
artists. Additionally, this plan mandated that ten percent (10%) of housing units be subsidized
for practicing artists and established specific zoning guidelines regarding the height and mass of
new buildings.215
It is worth noting that the city’s commitment to its very own plan has been questionable.
This fact became more than evident in the years immediately following the battle for 111 1 st
Street as the city council and the city government greenlit several projects exempt from the
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Powerhouse Arts District regulations. One source believed that a neighborhood organization had
formed “to hold the city accountable to [its] plan” and cited the city’s willingness “to grant
extreme variances from the [Powerhouse Arts District] plan” as a major point of contention with
the city.216 However, these events largely followed the story of 111 1 st Street.
Not surprisingly, the legal representation for New Gold Equities questioned the technical
legalities of the vote and promised immediate litigation over the legislation. New Gold Equities
complained that the city was favoring artists---specifically those of 111 1st Street---over property
owners. Acting Mayor Smith shot back that Goldman and his company had profited for years
due to the artists’ presence in the building. 217
Was the swift action by the city government due to frustration with the ownership and a
genuine solidarity with the homegrown arts community? Possibly, but even the greenest
observer of America politics and the urban political system and environment would question the
motives of these elected officials. A special election for the mayor’s office was scheduled for
November. The Acting Mayor and several councilmen and councilwomen were on the ballot for
that office. The downtown councilperson faced a primary election against a reform element in
the following spring. All the candidates would possibly earn political capital and public respect
for attacking a wealthy and out-of-town landlord and developer and for championing the
underdogs that were the artists of 111 1st Street. Even if New Gold Equities successfully blocked
the ordinance in court, the politicians could claim that they fought the good fight for a
constituency and embraced the cause of the artists as a campaign issue. Thus, the local
politicians had much to gain from the vote and little to lose.
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In November 2004, the fight between the artists and the owner developed a dark,
potentially deadly facet. A fire started in an empty studio on November 7, 2004 setting off the
sprinkler system. During an exchange, one source recalled receiving the news about the fire in
the building:

I [got] a frantic email in the middle of the night saying "help!
… the building is burning!"218

As in 2002, the artists’ studios suffered more damage from the water than the flames. An
investigation by the Jersey City Fire Department discovered that the fire was caused by a
disconnected gas pipe allowing “free-flowing gas to interact with lit piles of rags.”219 The rags
were set afire by candles placed in the studio. Prior to the fire, the studio had been vacant with
its doors locked and barred. An unknown individual had attempted to disable pipes in the
basement that fed the sprinkler system; however, the sprinkler system remained strong enough to
quench the fire. Following the fire, the fire department shut off the gas and sprinkler system in
111 1st Street and established a twenty-four hour watch on the building until the sprinkler system
could be repaired. Shortly after the fire, the arson unit declared the fire to be an act of arson, and
two employees of New Gold Equities were arrested on arson charges in December 2004. 220
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When asked about the charges and the employees, a lawyer for New Gold Equities responded
that as far as he knew “they were picked up for a parking ticket.” 221
Several suspicious details surrounded the fire in 111 1st Street. The fire broke out a day
before a court hearing in which Goldman would have sought a legal declaration that 111 1 st
Street was unsafe. This declaration would have rendered the recent historical designation moot
and allowed Goldman to proceed with redevelopment. The fire occurred in the same area of the
building that had been damaged by fire in 2002. The fire of 2004 resulted in the fire department
shutting off the gas to the building and forcing all the tenants to rely upon space heaters for
warmth in November and December. The fire made an already uncomfortable working and
living situation for the artists all the more difficult. Finally, it cannot be denied that employees
of the owner of 111 1st Street were arrested for arson.222 Physical threats and arson are historical
tactics embraced by more unscrupulous and less morally-inclined property owners and their
proxies in sites of displacement and gentrification.
During the months of November and December 2004, the continual presence of off-duty
police officers garnered further negative reaction from the tenants and from the local press.
Although the off-duty officers were purportedly on site to guarantee the safety and security of
111 1st Streets and its tenants, they seemingly paid little attention to crimes committed against
the artists or their property. In the weeks following the fire, the windows of two artists’ cars
were smashed, and one studio was burglarized. 223 More disturbingly, several artists and
journalists reported that the police officers forced visiting journalists from the building and
221
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threatened them with trespassing charges. During one such incident, a resident artist invited a
camera crew from New Jersey News into his studio for a scheduled interview concerning the
recent fire. The off-duty officers entered the artist’s studio and ordered the camera crew to
immediately vacate the premises. The artist commented on the action of the police and the
owner:
They’re trying to control the media. They have no
shame … it’s a news story.224

The New Jersey News reporter escorted out of the building by the police said:

We called the landlord to get permission to enter the
building but it sounded like the landlord didn’t want
us there.225

The actions of the off-duty police lent evidence to the claims that the police served as hired
muscle for Lloyd Goldman and New Gold Equities to control access to 111 1st Street and harass
the artists and the tenants.
In a more humorous episode, a tenant of 111 1st Street filmed a sizable group of Jersey
City police officers, some in uniform, some in plainclothes, but all with firearms and badges,
drinking heavily just outside of the building. One officer urinated on the wall of an adjacent
building, and several officers staggered to their vehicles and subsequently drove away. After a
meeting with city officials and Mayor Jerramiah Healy, the tenants’ association presented the
video of the drunken police officers. Mayor Healy watched the video and stated that he
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personally knew several of the officers. 226 The video entitled “Drunk Cops in Jersey City, NJ”
eventually went viral and was covered by a New York City news station in 2008. 227
The constant presence of off-duty police also raises a disturbing question regarding the
fire---later judged to be arson---of November 7, 2004: if the police were monitoring and
controlling the entrance to 111 1st Street, was the arsonist known to them and, by extension, the
ownership of the building? How was someone able to partially disable the water pipes in the
basement and enter a mothballed studio without the knowledge of the officers supposedly
patrolling the building?
Meanwhile, at the time of the fire and the running controversy over the off-duty police
officers, the political landscape shifted in Jersey City. Jerramiah Healy, a former judge and
councilman-at-large, won the special election for the mayor’s office in November 2004, running
on a law-and-order and neighborhood-centric platform. Healy entered city hall just as the fight
for 111 1st Street had entered its climatic stage but arguably the fate for the building was already
determined, if unseen by many of the participants. A source elaborated upon this situation:

Healy gets all the blame, but he essentially inherited
the mess. During his first week of office, forty
tenants [were] screaming drunk outside of his office.
He didn’t know what to make of it. Machinery
[determining 111 1st Street] already moving
at that point.228
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Nonetheless, when confronted with the issue of 111 1st Street, the Healy administration
established its own policy, and this policy fundamentally altered the city’s relationship with the
artists and the ownership.
Previously, the city government under the Cunningham administration supported--admittedly somewhat fitfully---the artists’ desire to remain in 111 1 st Street and attempted to
broker a favorable agreement between the artists and New Gold Equities to achieve this goal.
After Cunningham’s death, Acting Mayor Smith embraced a more confrontational stance,
launching a full-bore assault against the ownership and threatening to take the property through
eminent domain proceedings. This was a questionable and highly risky strategy: New Gold
Equities possessed far greater expertise and resources than the city government and certainly far
more than the artists. Furthermore, New Gold Equities understood that time was an invaluable
asset. They could simply wear down the opposition or wait for a more agreeable administration
to enter office. Finally, one should examine the political motivation behind Smith’s policy
strategy. He had much to gain in pursuing eminent domain and crafting an image as a savior of
the arts.
Instead of offering support for the artists after taking the mayor’s office in November
2004, Healy stated that he viewed the battle for 111 1st Street as a tenant-landlord issue and a
matter to be resolved through the professional staff of the city government and the court system:
he did not see 111 1st Street as a platform for political interference or grandstanding. Healy
explained his reasoning:

Eminent domain requires a commitment of taxpayer
funds. I cannot resolve this longstanding feud
between owner and artists by committing taxpayer
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money to bail them out.229

Healy, a former practicing attorney and judge, did not wish to spend city funds on an eminent
domain suit with a shaky foundation. Also, such a city-generated suit would establish a
precedent that the city government would likely be expected to follow in other high-profile
cases, and the Healy administration did not want this to occur.
This policy shift by the city government followed the issuance of a demolition permit for
specific structures within 111 1 st Street by a building code official. In December 2004, a city
employee approved an emergency demolition permit for an elevator shaft, a water closet shaft
and other portions of the southeast corner of 111 1 st Street. Two weeks prior to the granting of
the permit, a state Superior Court Judge ordered Goldman and New Gold Equities to submit a
plan to remediate the multitude of building code violations lodged against the building. The
building code official granted the demolition permit as the plan was presented to the judge. This
prompted an outcry by the artists who viewed this as another step toward Goldman finally
forcing them from the warehouse. Lawyers representing the artists requested that a stay be
placed on the permit, and the judge agreed to hear testimony by the city engineer explaining the
decision to grant the permit.230 Ultimately, the ownership was allowed to proceed with the
demolition as specified by the city official.
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Instead of questioning the decision of a member of the municipal professional staff,
Healy supported the staff member’s ruling and allowed that it could be challenged through
courts; however, Healy would not overrule the building code official or take a side on the matter.
A critic might argue that such action or inaction revealed a lack of support for the artists and a
politician bowing to the pressures of a wealthy developer, yet, by backing up the action of a
bureaucratic professional, Healy demonstrated an admirable and often lacking managerial quality
in aspiring politicians: he displayed confidence and respect in an experienced city worker and
wanted the process to proceed through the official channels. Healy publicly stood by the opinion
of the municipal employee:

[The official] is a longtime employee with good
standing in the city. I have to assume [he] did
what he had to do.231

Additionally, Healy deferred to the expertise and training of the staff member:
… I’m not an engineer and I have to give some
kind of credence to [the official]. Even if I could
inject myself here, I would not. I would let it
run its course through the courts.232
As noted earlier, many of the artists of 111 1st Street expressed particular distaste toward
Mayor Healy, but the machinery to push them from the studios and their home was churning
long before his mayoralty. He assumed office well toward the end of the battle for 111 1 st Street
and was never heavily engaged in the matter. Finally, it should be emphasized that Healy was
only the mayor and prominent local politician who did not make assurances and promises to the
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artists of 111 1st Street that he could not keep. Local, state, and federal elected officials made
grand pledges of support for the community housed in 111 1 st Street. But what did they
ultimately do? To his credit, Healy never promised anything that he could not deliver.
Nonetheless, the greater fears of the artists proved to be sadly justified. They rightly saw
the gradual demolition of 111 1st Street as a method to accelerate the slow death of their
community and a concerted effort by New Gold Equities to permanently remove them from the
building. When questioned about the demolition occurring within 111 1 st Street, a resident artist
remarked:
They’re willing to do anything to get rid of us.
They just want us gone.233

Another artist astutely perceived the strategy of the ownership:
It’s a domino effect. You take down a little, then
a little more and before you know it, it’s down to
the ground.234
On January 3, 2005, fifty-six of the tenants remaining in 111 1st Street appeared in State
Superior Court to reach a settlement with Lloyd Goldman and New Gold Equities. (The author
has been unable to establish why the legal avenues suddenly seemed closed to the artists.) The
artists hoped that they could prove that the ownership knew that the artists had been living in 111
1st Street for many years and that such evidence would buy them more time in the building. For
some reason, this line of argument never arose in the court proceedings. The respective lawyers
for the artists and the ownership reached an agreement, largely disappointing to the artists:
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Goldman would forgive eight months of back rent and provide a $35,000 settlement to cover the
artists’ legal fees, and the artists would vacate 111 1st Street by March 1, 2005.235
This settlement effectively killed the artistic community that lived, worked, and thrived in
111 1st Street. Following the court settlement of January 3, 2005, the artists and others assorted
tenants began to disperse from the warehouse. Some artists remained in Jersey City and others
settled in New York City or elsewhere in the greater metropolitan area. Still, others, feeling
emotionally, physically, and spiritually crushed, fled the setting of their former home and dreams
for distant parts of America and even foreign countries. Two days before the March 1, 2005
deadline, seventy-five tenants, friends, and supporters gathered in one artist’s studio for a final
farewell. An artist who partook in the gathering offered a vivid description:

[The] community [came] together in a joyous fashion.
[We] held a Last Supper for [our] last event with bread
and wine. Just like the real Last Supper.236
Many of the artists associated with 111 1st Street felt that the building and its community had
marked a high point not only their careers but in their creative endeavors and in their lives. They
all agreed that they had belonged to a special moment in a special place. Then, suddenly, it was
all gone.
Although the artists were evicted from 111 1st Street in March 2005, Goldman could not
fully demolish the building due to its historic designation. After the ownership petitioned the
city and launched a multi-million dollar lawsuit, it was granted the ability to tear down the
warehouse in 2006 and completed the demolition in 2007. A press conference and a flurry of
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fawning news reports announced the construction of a soaring structure designed by the firm of
Rem Koolhaus in early 2007. Currently, the site of the former tobacco warehouse is nothing
more than a pile of bricks and loose trash. This is a story deserving its own detailed narrative.
What remains of 111 1st Street and what was its legacy upon the arts community in Jersey
City and Jersey City as a whole? When asked this question, one source disparagingly remarked
that newer, younger artists in the city thought that “111 was a bunch of dirty hippies that got free
rent and didn’t appreciate it” but then followed that thought with the comment that the death of
111 1st Street was a “devastating loss” and that the building was an “immense benefit to the
city.”237 The majority of the sources agreed that the loss of 111 1 st Street substantially altered
the contours and the viability of the art community. 111 1 st Street had provided the community
and its regular events, such as the Arts Studio Tour, with a nucleus and a main staging ground.
Although an impressive number of artists and creative types continue to work and to live in
Jersey City, they are scattered throughout the city and its neighborhoods and are no longer
concentrated in a single site or a single area. Admittedly, many in the arts community see this as
a positive development for the long-term health of the arts and a way to build and grow artistic
clusters and neighborhoods throughout Jersey City. Fewer art galleries and art venues also exist
in Jersey City. Many sources contribute this dearth to the loss of 111 1 st Street, but the economic
downturn of 2008 and the stubborn sluggishness of the United States and overall global economy
may have just as much to do with this reality. Too many moving pieces belong to the local and
metropolitan creative economy and overall economy to attribute the expansion and the
contraction of the arts to any one factor. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the demise of 111
1st Street played in a role in the shrinkage (if only temporary) of the Jersey City arts community
and economy.
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In general, the loss of 111 1st Street diminished the image of Jersey City as a haven for
artists. A government official commented that the loss:

Affected the city and county economically---the
potential for cultural tourism development, through
the anchor of 111 First Street is a great disappointment.
Jersey City’s branding and identity was not helped
by the loss …238

An artist remarked:

Jersey City is now in the midst of "developer" and
"speculator" growth. There is very little of any arts
community left. No more 111 1st Street. Galleries
have closed. Non-profits have left. The museum is
now shuttered due the city hall budget cuts. I don't
know what will happen to Jersey City in the future,
but there will not be a renewed arts community
coming back to Jersey City. I’m not sure what the
city has to offer artists and vice versa … Jersey City
is a completely different place without 111. The
population that moved there to be part of that kind
of spirit and community are not happy and their lives
have changed as well. Not for the better.239

Those involved in the arts community, as practitioners, organizers, or supporters believe the city
government sees little use for the arts. One source heavily involved with an art non-profit
bitterly observed:

There is a prevailing message given to the arts
scene … "we don't want you, we won't fight for
you, we won't plan for your survival or provide
permanent spaces for you to thrive. You are on
your own. Good luck."240
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Although many individuals involved with 111 1st Street or the Jersey City arts scene
depicted a grim picture, especially following the demise of the building or, as what one former
resident characterized as “one big anthill, Tower of Babylon---that was just crushed,” others saw
a spirit of renewal borne from the destruction of their beloved community. 241 One former artist
and resident fondly recalled his role in organizing a massive arts exhibition and event in the
former Canco factory (now known as the Canco Lofts in an area of Jersey City edging toward
the Pulaski Skyway) in 2007, which “evoked the scale, drama, and funkiness of the old Art
Center at 111.”242 The event offered food and drinks to nearly 1700 patrons and lovers of the
arts and entertained them with live music, a fashion show, and, of course, art. The following
year, the group launched another kick-off event, attracting close to 2500 people. For this
alumnus of 111 1st Street, these successful arts events represented:
… a way to demonstrate the kind of muscle the arts
community could still bring to bear on a cultural event
in the city, and an affirmation of the legacy of 111 First
Street and the community of artists that gave so much
to the city.243
111 1st Street ushered in a new era for Jersey City and nurtured an artistic community at
its most fragile, nascent moment. After nearly a decade of anger, frustration, and struggle
alongside joy, friendship, and peace in a community of likeminded personalities and individuals,
the artists of 111 1st Street bid farewell to their habitat and their home and moved onward.
Although suffering a turbulent and treacherous economic and political environment, artists and
the arts still survive in Jersey City. Art and artists are resilient and always seeking new spaces,
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buildings, neighborhoods, and communities wherein to work, create, and dream. One source
offered this piece of optimistic commentary:

Whether or not a city makes plans for
permanent arts venues/neighborhoods, art
happens. Art happens because communities
need it.244

One source instead of cultivating rage and bitterness presented the author with a rueful,
yet circumspect interpretation of the story and the experience of 111 1 st Street. At an
unspecified date, his former business partner moved to China to participate in the arts scene. 245
In China, the People’s Liberation Army make it a practice to serve artists and artisans with a
day’s notice and then methodically bulldoze their buildings. “111 did better than them,” the
source concluded. 246
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Conclusion

This thesis began with the goal of measuring the history of 111 1 st Street against the
accepted narrative and theory encircling the gentrification process. As with any intellectual
endeavor, this project soon assumed a life of its own, and the author found himself exploring side
arguments and sorting stories with the leisure and the pleasure of a traveler in the woods
discovering forgotten paths. After several conversations with former tenants and those intimate
with 111 1st Street and after poring over newspapers articles on the subject, the author realized
that the project was a much more complex and enriching topic than originally envisioned. In
order to properly analyze 111 1st Street, the author believed that he needed to write the history of
111 1st Street before its most central participants disappeared into other parts of the country or
the world and their memories faded away. The author felt that he needed to tell the story of 111
1st Street or, at least, compose its opening chapter and invite other aspiring chroniclers to resume
the narrative. Believing that he has accomplished this, the author can return his focus to its
original goal.
What does the story and the history of 111 1st Street reveal about the standard scholarly
interpretations and theorizations concerning the gentrification process? How does it challenge or
confirm them?
The story of 111 1st Street centers upon a large community of artists in an outpost of the
greater New York City metropolitan region. Although Jersey City sits just across the Hudson
River from Manhattan and promises easier and faster access to Wall Street, Greenwich Village,
Union Square, and Herald Square than many of the more desirable and popular neighborhoods in
Brooklyn, Jersey City remains an afterthought to many people searching for apartments and
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homes. Why? A simple answer would be that Jersey City is located in New Jersey: a very
uncool place. Regardless, Jersey City stands as a city rich in its own tales, characters, and
histories. Several individuals known to the author have referred to Jersey City as the Oakland of
the East Coast---that is, a grittier, dirtier, and in some ways more radical sibling to a more
accomplished, popular, and attractive child. This is what made Jersey City appealing to a
generation of artists. At 111 1st Street, these artists created a unique, almost hermetically-sealed
community within the walls of a rambling, crumbling tobacco warehouse. They seemed to
believe that their community could transform Jersey City into a creative mecca for the entire
region. Then, their dreams were destroyed by a greedy developer and an uncaring political class.
111 1st Street challenges the gentrification narrative on several fronts. As mentioned
earlier in the broader discussion, gentrification is considered to be simultaneously a general and a
specific phenomenon and a global and universal process. That is, scholars and urbanists accept
that gentrification is unfolding in cities and urban areas (and even rural areas) throughout the
United States and the developed world; however, this global process occurs in different manners
and with different characteristics depending on the historical, political, social, and economic
currents and backgrounds of a respective locality. 247 Therefore, any observer and critic of Jersey
City would expect its gentrification, which began on a small scale in the 1980s, to exhibit unique
particularities or even anomalies. However, 111 1 st Street provides several examples of almost
complete deviations from the gentrification theories and narratives. These ideas were discussed
earlier in the thesis and will be recapped in the following discussion.
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The stage model of gentrification has shaped much thinking on the subject. 248 This
model posits that the complete and total gentrification of a given neighborhood or locale unfolds
in gradual, discrete steps. Initially, a group or groups of risk-adverse individuals seek out an area
for amenities or features unappreciated by middle-class, wealthy, or conservative elements of
society. These groups often consist of artists, writers, students, and gays and lesbians. What do
they see in these neighborhoods? It might be affordable and spacious apartments or homes. It
might be houses or buildings with fine design and details badly in need of upkeep and repair. It
might be a swirl of cultural, ethnic, or racial diversity. It might simply be the perceived freedom
offered by a neighborhood forgotten by the mainstream culture.
Following the “discovery” of an area, a secondary wave of new inhabitants arrives. The
members of this group possess more economic resources than those included in the initial wave,
yet likely consider themselves to be intellectually or creatively minded, espouse a liberal or
tolerant politics, and earn their livings in education, government, or creative industries such as
publishing or museums. Also, by no measure does this group fall in the category of the
economic elite: they are the privileged poor or, simply, an urban middle class.
Next in the stage model, we see professionals, lawyers, doctors, bankers with sizable
degrees of capital and economic resources purchasing property and moving into the
neighborhood. At this point, artists, students, and other “creatives” are largely priced out of the
area. Those protected by rent-control laws or a beneficent landlord or those who possessed the
capital and the foresight to purchase when the real estate prices were low might remain in the
neighborhood, but the area’s identity as an organic, vibrant creative center or fringe is effectively
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dead. Finally, large-scale investors and institutions begin to finance development in the area or
to purchase properties on the market.
The artists of 111 1st Street fell solidly into the category of the risk-adverse. Past
residents spoke with relish of the decayed state of the area and their close proximity to danger
during the early days of their community. After their removal from the building, many residents
had no financial cushion to fall back on and moved in with friends or family members. This
offers another explanation for their collective reason for fighting for the building. As detailed
earlier in this discussion, the artists began gravitating toward 111 1 st Street in the late 1980s
when the building and the surrounding area were moribund industrial artifacts. The building as a
past manufacturing site and its large, cheap spaces drew the artists to its warren of passages,
corridors, and lofts. This is a classic example of the first phase in the stage model.
How then does 111 1st Street challenge this model? Simply, the successive steps never
occurred. 111 1st Street and its surrounding area---eventually known as Work and Live District
Overlay (WALDO) and later the Powerhouse Arts District---never experienced the gradual, if
sometimes rapid waves of gentrification. The area transformed from an underutilized industrial
zone into a haven for artists and finally into a site of massive capital investment and
redevelopment. The second or third waves of gentrification, both compromised of individuals,
not corporate entities, never washed over 111 1st Street and the Powerhouse Arts District. The
redevelopment of 111 1st Street and the Powerhouse Arts District thus leapfrogged several
widely-accepted and long-observed stages in the gentrification process.
A critic might attack this argument by explaining that 111 1 st Street and the Powerhouse
Arts District stand as examples of new-built gentrification and that they should not be viewed
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through the parameters established by the stage model. New-built structures are apartment
complexes or mixed-use communities constructed on reclaimed brownfields or industrial
districts. Such structures are designed to create dense residential, retail, and office clusters and
to attract individuals and families desiring an urban lifestyle. As stated, new-built gentrification
largely occurs on abandoned industrial land, thus avoiding the displacement of established
communities or groups. However, new-built gentrification has been linked to residual
displacement and a negative impact on businesses and homes in surrounding neighborhoods.
Many cities and metropolitan areas view such a development plan as key to revitalizing
underused and unused land, increasing tax revenues, and drawing new businesses and residents.
Scholars have recently initiated a debate whether new-built structures constitute gentrification or
reurbanization.249
The Newport area of Jersey City, resting on the previously abandoned waterfront,
provides a stellar example of this emerging phenomenon. Prior to redevelopment in the 1980s,
the Jersey City waterfront was a mass of rusting railroad tracks and rotting wharves. Today, the
waterfront is a collection of office towers, residential high-rises, assorted retail and restaurants, a
boardwalk, and a recently opened public park and beach. Aside from a homeless and probable
criminal element, no residents were displaced due to the development of the waterfront in Jersey
City; nonetheless, this physical reshaping of the city has fundamentally altered its character and
socio-economic profile. The local economy relies far more upon the financial services sector
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than upon manufacturing, shipping, and storage, and the middle- and upper-classes are growing
in the city.
However, the experience of the artists at 111 1st Street did not reflect the description of
new-built gentrification. New-built gentrification does not initially involve the displacement of a
rooted population or community. Aging blocks are not demolished to make way for glitzy
apartment buildings; individuals and families are not pushed out of their homes to make way for
a more desirable class. At 111 1st Street, the steady actions of a determined owner ultimately
deprived the artists of their workplaces, homes, and community. This was also an existing
structure, which the owner originally hoped to redevelop and then market to a more affluent
population. The surrounding area, the Powerhouse Arts District, regulates certain specifics in all
construction and development projects. Zoning is usually altered and rewritten for the site of
new-built gentrification. Once the artists were evicted from 111 1st Street and the building was
demolished, the plans resembled new-built gentrification, but decidedly not before that point.
The most troubling way in which 111 1st Street challenges the accepted schools of
thought on gentrification is the evidence it presents concerning the value and the position of
artists in the gentrification process. Gentrification theory long ago accepted that artists are
integral, if not essential to the initiation of the gentrification process. This concept was first fully
analyzed in the scholarship of Sharon Zukin. 250 As examined by Zukin, the transformation of the
SoHo neighborhood in Manhattan from a site of light industry to art studios and art galleries and
finally expensive apartments and high-end shopping was set off by the “discovery” of the
neighborhood by New York’s artistic class.
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Zukin elaborated on this process and developed a theoretical concept called the artistic
mode of production. In this concept, investors, property owners, real estate professionals, even
municipal officials, and others associated with immobile capital view artists as a vehicle through
which to enhance the value of their property interests and maximize their investment profits.
(The artistic mode of production also fits nicely within the schema of the urban growth
coalition.) That is: property owners attract artists to a given area. The artists rehabilitate the
area, ancillary businesses and services gradually crop up, and then the area gains a sense of
cachet or hipness. This aura of the neighborhood serves as a beacon for individuals and
businesses with more financial resources and greater access to capital than the artists. These
individuals begin renting or purchasing property, establishing businesses, and allowing the
original group of investors to reap windfall profits on the land and the buildings. Of course, this
entire process leads to artists being priced out of the area and forces them to seek new
neighborhoods in which to live and work. The process also allows for the complete
transformation of the economic and social geography of a given neighborhood in order to suit
property owners and financial elites. SoHo was once a hub of light industry; however, such land
usage was seen as dirty, undesirable, and decreasingly unprofitable for the landed interests. By
allowing artists to inhabit loft spaces, the investor class was able to alter the SoHo’s zoning and
directly change the physical and economic characteristics of the neighborhood. These new
characteristics made the neighborhood more welcoming to an influx of capital and more likely to
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produce maximum profits. 251 The Williamsburg section of Brooklyn stands as a more recent
example of a neighborhood transformed through this mechanism. 252
This pattern was first observed and chronicled in the transformation and valorization of
Manhattan’s SoHo, but it has occurred throughout the United States, Canada, and likely other
cities in the Western or advanced capitalist world. Studies of Chicago, Toronto, London, and
Montreal serve as examples of similarly minded scholarship. 253 At first blush, 111 1st Street
seems to resemble this paradigm, yet once one bores deeper into the details of the history of the
building’s community and its unique gentrification experience, 111 1 st Street again challenges
another accepted idea of gentrification.
Were artists necessary for the redevelopment of 111 1 st Street and the surrounding area?
The original ownership of 111 1st Street seemed to believe that the artists could establish the
foundation for revitalizing the warehouse and its neighborhood and aggressively courted artists
in the late 1980s. The subsequent and current owner, New Gold Equities, essentially ignored the
artists throughout the 1990s and allowed its investment to lie fallow. According to the artistic
mode of production model, New Gold Equities and other area property owners should have
attempted to exploit the concentration of the artists to attract wealthier tenants and lure
businesses. This never occurred in the case of 111 1st Street. Instead, once property values
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soared in the 2000s, New Gold Equities moved to methodically and completely remove the
artists from the building. The artists were no longer seen as essential to the economic
revalorization of the building and the gentrification of the general vicinity.
This fact may very well call into question the necessity of artists and other “shock troops”
of gentrification to the process. Does capital still require certain groups to first move into an
area, beautify it, and generate buzz for further waves of gentrification? Or, in global cities such
as New York or its peripheral areas, such as Jersey City, can capital simply furnish a housing
supply to affluent individuals, businesses, and investors and quickly receive a profit? Obviously,
the case of 111 1st Street might stand as an aberration and not the new example. Nevertheless,
future research should explore this question and compare the case of 111 1 st Street to other
localities.
Today, SoHo no longer attracts hungry artists hoping to make a name for themselves or
aspiring curators hustling in galleries. Remnants of its avant-garde period and the spirit of its
creative explosion stubbornly cling to the neighborhood. Admittedly, high-end fashion
boutiques, trendy restaurants, and tourist traps dominate the majority of the blocks, yet a visitor
can still turn down a side street and find a well-stocked art supply store, a used-bookshop, or a
tiny café serving French pastry and café au lait. The same can be said of Greenwich Village in
Manhattan, and increasingly Wicker Park in Chicago, Northern Liberties in Philadelphia,
Williamsburg in Brooklyn, and Hoxton in London.
Capital follows arts, and those with capital follow artists. This pattern is well-established
and needs no debate. Once “discovered” by the forces of capital, the social, economic, and
physical character and composition of artistic neighborhoods permanently and often
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fundamentally change---and not for the better, in the view of artists and other creative types.
Nonetheless, an archaeology, a record of the neighborhood’s past and its inhabitants, exists in
forms of certain retail establishments (a bookstore, record shop, gallery, etc.) and businesses (a
café, restaurant, or bar) and actual people (old-timers, studios, or aging artists). This
neighborhood archaeology can be found throughout SoHo, Greenwich Village, and other former
bohemian epicenters.
In the case of 111 1st Street, such artifacts are largely absent. The artists were
unceremoniously driven out of their studios and homes in early 2005. Following their collective
eviction, New Gold Equities assiduously lobbied the city to spot-change the zoning to permit the
building of a structure beyond the restrictions and requirements of the Powerhouse Arts District
neighborhood. Full-scale demolition of 111 1st Street began in 2006 and concluded in 2007. The
site currently remains a pile of building scraps and debris, and debate over the final construction
project continues.

During its heyday, the community of 111 1 st Street thrived as a largely self-

contained entity, opening its doors to outsiders for seasonal tours and curious journalists. The
surrounding warehouses and former industrial structures remained dormant during the life of the
community, and few ancillary creative businesses sprouted and spread beneath the shadow of
111 1st Street. One source attributed this lack to the general financial insecurity of the artists. 254
This glaring archaeologically void might also be explained by the changing nature of the
American economy. Retail businesses long associated with creative individuals and countercultural types---bookstores, record stores, and cafes---are withering nationwide beneath the joint
assault of online retail and chain stores. It is extremely risky to launch such a venture and
unlikely that such a business will survive in today’s economy.
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As discussed earlier in the work, downtown Jersey City has undergone substantial, more
traditional stage-model gentrification over the past three decades, and Newport was and remains
a site of new-built gentrification. Both areas have gained better, more high-income-oriented
businesses, restaurants, and services during this time. The Powerhouse Arts District
neighborhood, the former home of 111 1st Street, has witnessed a small, yet noticeable clustering
of cafes, boutiques, and creative industries since the demise of 111 1 st Street. Such development
resembles the emergence of a creative economy. 255 Although some downtown growth might be
attributed to the former presence of the artists of 111 1st Street, all development in the
Powerhouse Arts District arose after the death of the arts commune in 111 1 st Street.
In many ways, the discussion of a “creative class” in the past decade dovetailed with the
notion of the artistic mode of production. The creative class theory posits that the key to
economic success currently hinges on the ability of a given neighborhood, city, or region to
attract and retain individuals and business enmeshed in the creative economy. Unfortunately, the
primary proponent of this theory, Richard Florida, lumps together many vocations and fields
which have little if anything in common and labeled them as “creative.” For example, he views
both financial service professionals and visual artists as members of this larger creative class.256
111 1st Street also highlights several flaws in the creative class theory.
The chronicle of 111 First Street and its ousted community of artists challenges the
reality of a creative class as defined by Florida. In this instance, artists---the population lauded
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by proponents of the creative class theory as the vanguard of the re-urbanization---were forced
out of an area not due to the “natural” flow of gentrification, but by the developer’s
determination to attract extremely well-heeled professionals working in finance, banking, law,
and other lucrative industries. Ironically, these latter individuals also belong to the creative class
according to the characteristics formulated by Richard Florida. The drive by officials and
investors in Jersey City (and other urban areas) to attract this particular stratum of the creative
class also demands a further revisiting of the viability of other aspects of the creative class
theory.
One of the fundamental and laudable premises of the theory, for example, is quality of
place. Florida stresses this value, challenging urban politicians and elites to consider its value in
their own cities and regions.257 Creative individuals and professionals are attracted to a specific
city or geographic region due to its particular features and amenities, such as parks, architecture,
ethnic enclaves, walkable neighborhoods, culture, and the arts. Obviously, if a region possesses
such resources and continues to develop and conserve them, all residents and not just the creative
class benefit from such civic enrichment. Quality of place can engender civic pride and
activism, provide citizens from all walks of life with places to gather and relax, allow the
possibility of casual interactions among strangers and neighbors, and offer experiences in culture
from the street to concert halls and museums.
In the case of 111 First Street, the exact opposite movement occurred. The artists
anchored an area that predictably should have transformed due to the gradual forces of
gentrification, following the pattern of Toronto’s Liberty Village, Manhattan’s SoHo, Chicago’s
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Wicker Park, or other clusters of artists in urban areas. 258 According to the typical progressions
of gentrification, the artists should have burnished the reputation of the area, thereby attracting
creative firms and professionals desirous to its roughhewn environment of its Victorian-era
warehouses and silent train tracks. Following that, more investors would have arrived,
refurbished the buildings, developed amenities and services, and promoted the authenticity of the
emerging neighborhood. Undoubtedly, conflict and displacement would have occurred.
However, something far more dramatic and abrupt happened in the case of 111 First Street. The
speed of gentrification accelerated, and the process disappeared altogether as the neighborhood
jumped from the initial, rather quiet phase of gentrification to traumatic restructuring. An
extremely wealthy and influential investor purchased the building, evicted the tenants, and
ultimately destroyed the building. If quality of place is valued by the creative class, why would a
developer hoping to attract the most affluent strata of that class destroy the most unique fixture
and irreplaceable community in the area?
What did New Gold Equities gain by the successful eviction of the artists from 111 1 st
Street and the eventual destruction of the building? Why would the company destroy an
irreplaceable asset---the concentration of the artists---proven to attract an educated and affluent
population? Why did the ownership refuse to accommodate the artists in the development of the
property? With the lucrative examples of loft properties in SoHo, Williamsburg, and other more
distant cities and localities, why did New Gold Equities elect to demolish the historic tobacco
warehouse? The simple response is greed. The struggle over 111 1 st Street peaked during the
heady days of the real estate bubble of the 2000s. However, a more circumspect, yet concise
interpretation of the ownership’s goals should be attempted.
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In the short-term, especially in light of the contemporary economic downturn, the
ownership of 111 1st Street gained little from the defeat of the artists and the subsequent razing
of the warehouse. New Gold Equities lost steady, reliable, albeit modest rents, and now the
property lies fallow while the ownership waits for the economy to improve and to resolve
standing squabbles with the city. In the long-term, the ownership gained the ability to alter and
remap the physical space, the very geography of Jersey City. The artists collectively stood as a
barrier to capital, representing a rejection of a culture and a lifestyle consumed with the idea of
getting and spending: that is, the artists existed as a group attempting to forge an alternative to
the dominant economic and social system. Viewing 111 1 st Street as a community---not just a
physical and economic structure---the artists espoused a pre-capitalist mentality. Thus, in order
to accomplish its more long-reaching goal, the ownership had to remove the artists of 111 1 st
Street to produce a social geography benefiting capital. 259 Capitalism as a system requires
constant expansion.260 111 1st Street as an arts community existed as an impediment to such
growth, further explaining why it had to perish.
The author of this particular study devoted his research to 111 1 st Street in order to shift
the gentrification debates away from the better known and more frequently chronicled
metropolises of New York, Toronto, and London. Such cities offer engaging and rather easily
discovered stories of gentrification; however, smaller cities, those sitting at the metropolitan edge
of dominant cities or existing as centers themselves offer exciting and rewarding challenges to
scholars and thinkers. The author hopes that other writers will see this work as both a model and
an inspiration to expand gentrification narratives beyond their comfortable, well-worn confines.
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Finally and most importantly, the author approached the subject of 111 1 st Street and its
artists as an act of preservation. The community dispersed in the early months of 2005, and the
physical structure itself now exists only in photographs, art, and memory. Some of the former
residents and artists of 111 1st Street still work and live in Jersey City and Hudson County, but
others have moved to other parts of the country or the world. Memories drift away, and people
quickly forget past lives. Before the author embarked upon this project, 111 1 st Street may have
been destined for the rubbish bin of history. Now, such a bleak fate seems a little less likely.
111 1st Street is now gone and fading into memory and the past. However, this study aimed to
preserve that memory before it was lost to decay and neglect. The author hopes that he has
achieved this goal and he hopes that others will build a richer, greater story of 111 1st Street upon
his rough foundation.
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Appendix I: Figures, Photographs, Maps, & Assorted Images

Figure 1: P. Lorillard Tobacco Company, 111 1st Street, Jersey City, New Jersey, circa 1883. (Richard Edwards,
Industries of New Jersey, Hudson, Passaic, and Bergen Counties (1883): 886.)

Figure 2: 111 1st Street, Jersey City, New Jersey, October 2004. The scaffolding suggests that New Gold Equities was
already working on the “stabilization” of the structure. (Photograph courtesy of Bill Rodwell.)
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Figure 3: 111 1st Street Jersey City, New Jersey, February 2006. The bulldozer sits on the site of the demolished 110 1st
Street. Note the office tower construction in the background. (Photograph courtesy of Bill Rodwell.)

Figure 4: 111 1st Street, Jersey City, New Jersey, November 2010. (Photograph courtesy of Jessica Murphy, Ph.D.)
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Figure 5: 111 1st Street, Jersey City, New Jersey, November 2010. Note the Trump Building in the background. The
Powerhouse is a designated historical landmark and is currently slated for redevelopment.
(Photograph courtesy of Jessica Murphy, Ph.D.)

Figure 6: Advertisement included in media press packet. This advertisement was part of a marketing campaign to attract
artists as tenants to 111 1st Street, Jersey City, New Jersey. (Courtesy of the Jersey City Free Public Library).
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Figure 7: Hudson & Manhattan Trains Powerhouse, Jersey City, New Jersey, November 2011.
(Photograph courtesy of Jessica Murphy, Ph. D.)

Figure 8: Empty interior, 111 1st Street, Jersey City, New Jersey, February 2005. (Photograph courtesy of Bill Rodwell.)
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Figure 9: Chimney of 111 1st Street, Jersey City, New Jersey. This was an architectural feature treasured and fondly
remembered by many former residents and artists. (Photograph courtesy of Bill Rodwell.)
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Map 1: Jersey City, New Jersey. (Courtesy of Google Maps.)

Map 2: 111 1st Street and surrounding areas, Jersey City, New Jersey. (Courtesy of Google Maps.)
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Appendix II:
Interview Questions: Artists
1. Describe your affiliation with 111 1st Street:
2. How long was your residency?
3. Can you describe the nature of the arts community at 111 1 st Street?
4. Did your community affect the renewed growth of Jersey City?
5. Were you engaged in the protest against eviction and demolition?
6. Has the loss of 111 1st Street affected the local arts scene and the area in general?
7. How did the loss of 111 1st Street affect you?

Interview Questions: Businesses
1. Were you operating during 111 1st Street?
2. How did the presence of 111 1st Street affect your business?
3. Were you involved in the protest over evictions and demolition?
4. Has the loss of 111 1st Street affected the area and your business?
5. Has the loss of 111 1st Street affected the local arts scene and the area in general?

Interview Questions: Public Officials
1. Were you in the area (working for the municipality, etc.) during the debate over 111 1 st
Street?
2. Were you involved in the process? If so, in what capacity?
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3. Was the process handled properly?
4. How has the loss of 111 1st Street affected PAD and Jersey City?
5. Has the loss of 111 1st Street affected the local arts scene and the area in general?
6. How does the city government interact with the arts community?
7. How does the arts community impact Jersey City?

Interview Questions: Non-Profits
1. Were you operating during 111 1st Street?
2. How did the presence of 111 1st Street affect your organization?
3. Were you involved in the protest over evictions and demolition?
4. Has the loss of 111 1st Street affected the area and your organization?
5. Has the loss of 111 1st Street affected the local arts scene and the area in general?
6. How does the city government interact with the arts community?
7. How does the arts community impact Jersey City?

Interview Questions: Businesses and Public Officials Answering “No” to Question 1
1. What have you heard about 111 1st Street?
2. Does an arts community exist in Jersey City?
3. What does the arts community lack in Jersey City?
4. How does the government/business community interact with the arts community?
5. How does the arts community impact Jersey City?
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Message Board Query
1. I am a graduate student at Fordham University, researching the former arts community at
111 1st Street. If you resided or worked in the building, I would like to opportunity to ask
you a few questions in person or via email. Please contact me at: _______.
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